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This report presents the views of CAE and selected representatives of marine indus-
tries. The recommendations have been generated independent of government to
stimulate future discussion around marine economic opportunities. Some recommen-
dations in the report relate specifically to identified barriers and opportunities facing
certain marine industries.
CAE acknowledges that other recommendations in the report involving direct financial
support, such as subsidies or tax reduction, would be welcomed by any industry. We
comment that a strong case, such as demonstrated market failure, would need to be
made before the government would consider their application to particular marine
industries.
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Oceans are Frontier Territories, where sovereignty has been established but only
limited commercial and economic development has occurred and substantial
untapped opportunities are perceived.
Commercial
Development
Economic
Development
Frontier
Territories
Establishment of a new economic activity as a consequence of a viable business
case.
Aggregate of commercial developments in a sector, region or the nation.
DEFINITIONS
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Development of Oceans Policy to date has
established that a substantial number of
opportunities exist for possible commercial
development, including expansion of existing
industries and the development of whole new
sectors of the New Zealand economy.  CAE has
contributed to that recognition, in particular
through its ”Our Oceans” Conference in 19991
and subsequent programmes of work directed
at gaining better recognition of the economic
importance to New Zealand of its Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf
extensions.
In advancing the development of an Oceans
Policy, the Ministry for the Environment has
identified a desire to better understand the
factors that lead to or impede commercial
development, especially of new sectors, and
has commissioned this investigation of the
subject, with a view to informing the design of
suitable interventions that could catalyse such
sustainable development. Our basis is that
Oceans Policy is intended to promote the
sustainable economic development of marine
resources, whilst preserving the integrity of
oceans ecosystems and social and cultural
values of the oceans
Clearly an analysis of the broad spectrum of
oceans opportunities would almost be without
limit. Therefore to gain a practical understand-
ing of the issues, barriers and opportunities
facing development of economic activities in
the ocean this investigation considered only a
selection of cases, all pertaining to the energy
sector, and representing a temporal spectrum
from historic (the discovery and development
of the Maui gas and oil field) through contem-
porary (current oil and gas exploration and
development) and near-term (wave and tidal
electricity generation) to far-term (gas hydrate
mining and conversion). These cases, in turn,
spanned the full range of anticipated activities
from fully commercial to future-focussed
potential activity.
At various times in our history, the shape of
the New Zealand economy has been impacted
by bold government interventions at key
junctures, for better or worse.  One such
instance was part of an aggressive response to
the energy crises of the 1970’s, which hap-
pened to coincide broadly with the discovery in
1969 and subsequent appraisal of the giant
Maui gas field off the Taranaki coast by the
Shell BP and Todd consortium.  The exploration
campaign that resulted in Maui was itself a
response to two precursor conditions: the
progressive international development and
deployment of marine exploration and develop-
ment technologies, and the passage of the
Continental Shelf Act 1964 that provided for the
application of the Petroleum Act 1937 beyond
the narrow territorial sea and out to 200
nautical miles from shore (the Exclusive
Economic Zone).
While these “settings” were sufficient to enable
development of the resource that has done
much to fuel New Zealand’s economic activity
over the past quarter century, during the early
1970’s the business case for the field’s devel-
opment was marginal at best without the bold,
direct involvement of the New Zealand govern-
ment.  The intervention took the form of a
direct (50%) equity interest in the joint
venture, in consideration for guaranteed
project revenues through a take-or-pay con-
tract. This commitment by government, in turn
provided the impetus for development of the
vast majority of the infrastructure needed for
consumption – power stations, the pipeline
grid and associated networks, and a petro-
chemical industry.  Initially much of this was in
public hands but eventually these enterprises
were all corporatised and mainly privatised but
collectively have accounted, both directly and
indirectly, for a substantial proportion of
national economic product over the intervening
period; with particular regional importance in
Taranaki.
As a consequence, offshore oil and gas
exploration since Maui was brought on-stream
in 1979 has not required government involve-
ment; the former state oil company (Petrocorp)
being privatised in 1987.  A number of commer-
1 Our Oceans - A Journey of Understanding, CAE Comments
Series No. 1, 2001
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cial discoveries have been made offshore
Taranaki, and some sub-commercial discoveries
in offshore South Island basins.  In recent
years it has become evident that the rate of
discovery and delineation of gas reserves in
New Zealand has not kept pace with produc-
tion, and with the pending depletion of the
Maui field squeezing the reliability of future
thermal fuel requirements for the national
power system, government has decided to
make some relatively modest interventions to
stimulate exploration.  The exploration sector
remains at a critical juncture as rapid escala-
tion in global oil and gas prices have impacted
on activity levels and put pressure on the
availability of core capability such as seismic
vessels and drilling rigs.  Policy settings are
under constant review to ensure as far as
possible that New Zealand’s undiscovered
conventional petroleum resources yield the
desired discoveries to sustain and if possible
extend fuel stocks and their contribution to our
energy system.
As global oil and gas prices have reset the
economics of energy technologies, and climate
change policies have tended to promote
renewable electricity generation in particular,
marine renewable energy sources have begun
to move closer to commercial viability.  New
Zealand has substantial potential opportunities
for both wave and tidal power generation and
currently up to 12 projects are under investiga-
tion.  These all draw on the implementation of
technology that has been developed overseas
and adapted for specific New Zealand sites. In
some respects this is analogous to most of the
considerable wind power development New
Zealand has seen in the past few years.
Setting aside the not inconsiderable technical
risk factors that dominate investment in this
industry our investigation has found that
proponents of wave and tidal projects, while
enjoying a high level of “moral support” from
government policy including access to R&D
funding, see themselves as being quite
seriously impeded by issues generally lumped
together as related to the Resource Manage-
ment Act. Perhaps, more accurately, this reflects
insufficient clarity as to property rights and
market dynamics.  It is obvious, however, that
under current settings it is near impossible for
a project sponsor to constrain the expense and
delays that may be attendant on an initiative
to secure the right to install a marine power
station and offer its production into the
electricity market.
The wave and tidal energy case illustrates the
very best and the very worse of entrepreneurial
or pioneer development. Technical risks are
generally high and the often nebulous policy
support for renewable energy (for example) is
not sufficient to facilitate consequent develop-
ment. Support to these types of activities must
be supplemented by detailed attention to
uncertainties in the business cases, which are
related to completion and to revenue risk
during early stage development.
Another potential energy source, yet to be
proven viable, that research has been shown to
be an important aspect of New Zealand’s
marine realm, is gas hydrate.  The most
optimistic timeline for commercial exploitation
of gas hydrate is at least one decade away.
While current research, at a modest but
material level, is improving the inventory and
characterisation of the resources offshore New
Zealand, there appears to be a complete gap in
research addressing the technology for sustain-
able exploitation of the resource, for which
New Zealand is generally considered likely to
be dependent on overseas innovation.  There
is no sign of commercial interest in gas hydrate
commercialisation, and while such develop-
ment would appear to be governed by the
Crown Minerals Act 1991 it is not certain that
this statute will indeed provide the optimal
development regime.  Also, investment will be
discouraged by the very high risk levels in the
absence of any fiscal incentives.
In summary, these three cases demonstrate
that to be effective, interventions will have to
be carefully tailored to meet the particular
impediments or circumstance that face the
various opportunities for commercial develop-
ment in the ocean.  Extending this finding to
Ocean’s development as a whole suggests that
two key points are paramount:
Technological innovation is essential but a
small economy can only expect to maintain a
cutting edge position in very few fields and
otherwise, the contribution of resources such
as gas hydrate will have to await the availabil-
ity of technology from overseas sources; as the
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discovery of the Maui Field followed interna-
tional technological advances in the 1960’s.
An effective statutory and regulatory framework
is essential for new sectors to develop in a
desirable and orderly fashion.  While resources
such as petroleum and fish are governed by
specific regimes, it is not apparent that these
regimes can be extended universally into other
marine-based industries.  In the absence of
such a framework, history tells us that the
Resource Management Act proved an insuffi-
cient and unsatisfactory de facto regulatory
framework for aquaculture, resulting in a
moratorium that curtailed the realisation of the
industry’s growth potential. With the emergent
marine energy sector reliance on current
planning and consenting frameworks appears
to be similarly compromising renewable energy
initiatives.
Finally, where opportunities and technology
exist, investment may still not be forthcoming
when major risk factors cannot be offset.  In
such cases government may consider specific
interventions even though these may distort
market functionality.  The interventions in the
energy sector during the 1970’s, while imper-
fect, have nevertheless delivered a key point of
competitiveness to the New Zealand economy
that would be desirable to sustain.  Recent
modest initiatives to facilitate gas exploration
go some way, and other instruments should be
considered, both to extend existing marine
industries and to catalyse the development of
others such as wave and tidal power and,
eventually if proven technologically viable, gas
hydrate.
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1  BACKGROUND
1.1  Introduction
The Ministry for the Environment (MFE) is
leading the whole-of-government development
of an Oceans Policy that will enable the
integrated and consistent management of the
Ocean Territory within New Zealand’s jurisdic-
tion.
New Zealand’s Ocean Territory encompasses
close to 6 million square kilometres (or 15
times its terrestrial landmass), representing
approximately 1% of the Earth’s surface.
However, only a very small part of it has been
surveyed to date and early indications suggest
vast and potentially valuable resource opportu-
nities, including, for example:
• Hydrocarbon deposits worth approximately
NZ$100 billion and Manganese deposits
worth approximately NZ$200 billion2;
• Phosphoric deposits (for use in agriculture)
on the Chatham Rise worth approximately
NZ$10 billion3;
• The largest Methane Hydrate deposits in
the South Pacific4.
However, New Zealand’s ability to realise the
economic potential of these resources is
limited by a number of factors, including the
‘frontier’ nature of the proposed activities and
consequently high investment requirements,
access to and availability of cost effective
‘enabling’ technology, appropriate legislative,
regulatory and policy frameworks, and access
to markets and margins that would justify
commercial development.
MfE has sought to gain a better understanding
of these factors by commissioning an investiga-
tion into barriers to the commercial develop-
ment of 3 economic opportunity cases in order
to ensure that the new national Oceans Policy
framework will have the ability to support the
sustainable development of such opportunities.
1.2  Purpose and Scope of
Consultancy
The purpose of the project was for CAE, by
consulting with a range of marine sector
representatives, to bring a business-focussed
perspective of the potential barriers to the
commercial development of maritime opportu-
nities, and to provide practical examples of
corresponding strategies or interventions to
overcome them.
The scope of the project was limited to
consultation interviews with approximately 15
respondents to highlight and illustrate through
case studies, the key ingredients for develop-
ment of commercial activities through study of
three specific maritime opportunity cases at
different stages of commercial maturity.
Consequently, this Report is not intended as an
exhaustive solution to the challenges of
formulating appropriate policies for each of the
resource opportunities highlighted or provide
conclusions that are applicable across the
entire marine sector but, instead attempts to
offer an assessment of the range of interven-
tions that can assist with development of
commercial activities.
2 Dominion Post; 13/10/99: p11
3 Economic Opportunities in New Zealand’s Oceans; Centre
for Adanced Engineering for Oceans Policy Secretariat: p6
4 Economic Opportunities in New Zealand’s Oceans; p5
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2  APPROACH
2.1  Case Studies
CAE’s previous work on Oceans Policy (2003)
has identified a substantial number of areas
with potential for commercial development in
addition to those sectors that already contrib-
ute economic activity and have varying degrees
of growth potential.  The scope of the present
project is limited to three case studies and one
existing sector as a basis for comparison.  We
selected the Maui gas and oil field as the
established case, and have chosen three cases,
all concerned with energy resources, that lie on
a spectrum from active through advanced pre-
commercial to long-term commercial but
research-dependent.
2.2  Consultation
Consultation with industry was undertaken in 3
phases:
a. Phase 1 consisted of wide ranging unstruc-
tured interviews with 5 general sector
representatives who have policy, regulation,
scientific and commercial roles in the
maritime space;
b. Phase 2 consisted of in-depth structured
interviews with a minimum of 3 respond-
ents for each specific resource opportunity
(9 respondents total);
CASE STUDY RESOURCE
OPPORTUNITY
RELEVANCE
Success Story The Discovery,
Development and
Production of the
Maui gas and oil field
When enabling technology became available,
a governance framework already existed for a
major discovery to be made.  However,
considerable intervention was necessary for
its development
Current Opportunity Oil and Gas
Exploration
Considerable private sector investment in
response to perceived opportunities, are
governance arrangements optimal to give
best chance of restoring inventory and
sustaining supply?
Emergent /
Undeveloped
Opportunity
Wave & Tidal Energy Emerging technology being tested but as yet
no viable business case identified;
governance and/or economic interventions
may catalyse development
Future Opportunity Methane Hydrates Very large resource opportunity awaits
technology development in first instance;
governance deserves detailed consideration
Table 1: Case Studies
c. Phase 3 consisted of a 2 day Workshop,
involving MfE, MED, the CAE Project Team
and the earlier respondents, to review and
validate the issues raised in the consulta-
tion process.
2.3  Analytical Framework
Each of the 3 case studies were examined in
terms of the impact of a range of critical
ingredients (e.g. infrastructure, investment,
technology, policy, etc) that would support the
evolution of a particular sector from an
‘embryonic’ or emergent stage towards ‘critical
mass’, at which point they would be expected
to sustain material contributions to the
national economy.
For each of the case studies, we attempted to
identify and benchmark the gaps that exist
between “embryonic” or “pre-embryonic”
stages of a sector’s development and the
attainment of “critical mass”, against an
established case: the successful discovery,
development and production of the Maui gas
and oil field.
This analysis was intended to assist in the
identification of optimal government interven-
tions to address the gaps, so as to support the
development of the resource opportunity and
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stimulate a growth sector that can ultimately
enable the sector to achieve critical mass and
contribute to the growth of the national
economy on a sustained basis.
2.4  Case Study Structure
Each case study is intended to illustrate the
following issues:
• Current activity in New Zealand and
internationally, including proposed or actual
commercial activity;
• Reported barriers and issues impacting on
commercial development activities, specifi-
cally in terms of “Know How”, “Capital”
and “Property Rights”;
• Analysis of the reported barriers and
issues;
• Recommendations on potential strategies
and/or interventions to overcome or
mitigate the reported barriers, constraints
and issues.
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3  KEY FINDINGS
3.1  Summary of Case
Studies
The Discovery, Development and
Production of Maui
Success Story
Maui was discovered by the Shell-BP-Todd
(SBPT) consortium in 1969 and commenced
production in 1979. With an estimated 3830bcf
of gas reserves, it was one of the largest
offshore gas fields ever discovered at that time.
Key factors underlying Maui’s successful
development include:
• Exploration Technology – Acquisition of NZ’s
first seismic data by SBPT reduced their
exploration risk and led to the discovery of
Kapuni and then Maui; also, the discovery
was drilled during the first deployment of
an offshore drilling rig to New Zealand.
• Policy – Continental Shelf Act 1964 vested
offshore resources with NZ Government and
allowed the issuing of permits; the Govern-
ment’s role as the major purchaser of Maui
gas (through the Take-Or-Pay agreement)
enabled the economic production of the
field; the oil crisis in the 70’s led to the
development of supportive policies e.g.
energy self sufficiency and efficiency;
• Energy Demand – The international oil crisis
and attendant high prices and short
supplies in the Pacific created a substitu-
tion opportunity for fuelling the thermal
power stations then being built and
meeting the country’s needs for transport
fuels;
• Maui Joint Venture – provided for Govern-
ment sharing of production risk, infrastruc-
ture development, cost overruns in platform
construction and redesign, as well as the
‘upside’.
Oil & Gas Exploration
Established industry
NZ has an active exploration industry focused
on the Taranaki Basin where it has been
successful in the past. Expansion of the
industry is primarily dependent on the capital
and know-how of international exploration
companies and their business decisions based
on global market factors and their appreciation
of prospectivity.
NZ currently ranks 14th internationally in terms
of attractiveness to exploration investment5.
Reported barriers to expanding exploration
activity includes:
• The highly competitive international
exploration ‘marketplace’, including higher
prospectivity in other parts of the world,
closer proximity to markets, better access
to equipment, availability of and access to
high quality exploration data, etc;
• The relatively small NZ gas market, histori-
cally low prices for gas in NZ due to
oversupply from Maui, and associated
transportation and logistics issues related to
New Zealand’s distance to other markets;
• The infrequency in recent times of economi-
cally significant discoveries like Maui (2000
discovery of the 700PJ Pohokura field is an
exception) that would stimulate exploration
activity;
• no discoveries to date of a scale to justify
development of new infrastructure and
production outside the Taranaki Basin;
• The predominance of gas rather than the
more desirable oil in the NZ Basin structures.
Wave & Tidal Energy
Emergent opportunity
An emergent industry reliant on technology
developed overseas. An industry grouping
5 “The Oil & Gas Market In New Zealand: A
Sector Summary”, UK Trade & Industry
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(AWATEA) has just been formed and there are
approximately 12 projects at various stages
presently underway. However, none are
expected to be capable of deployment within
at least a 24-month timeframe.
Reported barriers to the development of the
wave and tidal energy industry in NZ were
mainly related to their uncertainty in respect of
the operation of the RMA which is a de facto
“portal” for development but is seen as
inefficient in dealing with novel projects for
which plans are almost always silent.  Specific
issues identified by respondents include:
• The NIMBY issue and the ease in which
objections can be lodged under the RMA
and the potential for perceived vexatious
objectors;
• The high perceived costs and complexities
of consent applications relative to the small
scale of the proof-of-concept or technology
demonstration projects currently being
planned;
• The absence of a specific protocol for
offshore wave and tidal projects that would
streamline and standardise the application
process for both the industry and consent-
ing regional authorities, thereby minimising
inconsistent processing of applications
across regions;
• Perceived sovereign risk as a result of the
ongoing Foreshore & Seabed debate, the
Moratorium on Aquaculture and Minister of
Conservation’s veto powers over restricted
coastal activities;
• Perceived business risk in the allocation
regime posed by the “first-in-first-served”
policy and the potential for both “free
riders” and speculators to secure occu-
pancy and use rights ahead of industry
trailblazers;
• Reliance on predominantly overseas
developed technology that is largely still
pre-commercial and unproven, and which is
expected to be relatively expensive to
import to NZ;
• Uncertainty over the cost of, and responsi-
bility for, infrastructure development and
access to the national grid as a result of
the low priority given to wave & tidal by
the big power companies;
• Investment difficulties due to negative
media reporting of deficiencies and failures
of the RMA process.
Such uncertainties, compounded, impose a risk
premium that severely dampens any business
case already burdened with significant technol-
ogy risk, with the effect that the required
capital investment will not be forthcoming until
greater clarity is achieved, or unless the risks
are offset through tax concessions, revenue
guarantees, or similar instruments.
Gas Hydrates
Future opportunity
Future opportunity, not immediately
commercialisable due to the technical com-
plexities of extraction, transportation, environ-
mental implications and a fundamental lack of
scientific and engineering knowledge of the
resource.
NZ gas hydrate deposits discovered offshore in
the Hikurangi (East Coast) and Fiordland
margins. Additional indications of deposits in
Canterbury, Great South and Taranaki Basins.
Japan (USD$50m pa funding), Canada and the
US lead gas hydrate research worldwide.
Scientists from GNS, Canterbury and Otago
Universities currently leading NZ research
efforts.
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3.2  Reported Cross
Sectoral Issues and
Barriers
The following issues were reported uniformly
across the case studies.
Policy
• Need to address inconsistent application of
environmental policy across different
regional councils and government depart-
ments, particularly in respect of project
planning processes – inconsistencies
leading to delays and increased opportu-
nity costs;
• Need to develop consent processes scaled
to meet the scope of typical projects in
frontier industries e.g. exploration, proof-of
concept, technology demonstration, site
assessment etc;
• Need to acknowledge and secure property
rights of trailblazers / pioneers in frontier
industries - the present allocation regime
with its “first in first served” policy under-
mines investment in the industries by
permitting “free riders” and speculators to
secure property and use rights to resources
without contributing to the development of
the industry;
• Need to develop mechanisms to sanction
speculators who secure use rights over
resources but do not maximise the value of
those resources to the New Zealand
economy in a timely manner; [last 2 points
are important and interwoven – one
person’s pioneer/trailblazer is another’s
speculator]
• Design property rights and systems for
their allocation and administration that
balance incentives to pioneers and trail-
blazers with constraints on pure specula-
tors and monopolists, to foster the emer-
gence of effective market dynamics in
emerging commercial sectors.
Technology & Specialist Equipment
• Need to develop mechanisms that would
provide timely access to new technologies
and specialist equipment given New
Zealand’s reliance on overseas technologies
and expertise resulting from the limited
capacity NZ has to meet the high R&D
costs for new frontier activities;
• Need to consider ways of attracting
specialist operators and expertise to New
Zealand in the face of worldwide demand
and competition for equipment (e.g. oil and
gas drilling rigs) and expertise - the tight
supply is reportedly leading to significantly
increased costs and delays in deployment
and these delays in turn threaten tenure to
prospective areas.
Investment
• Need to address the impact of policy
related sovereign risk issues (e.g. Foreshore
& Seabed, Aquaculture Moratorium) and
business risk issues (e.g. allocation regime)
on inwards investment – inconsistent and
ad hoc policy is leading to uncertainty and
perceptions of unreasonable risk;
• Pioneering investments that have the
potential to seed developments from which
new sectors can emerge may need to be
favoured with taxation or other provisions
(such as flow-through of losses to share-
holders) to overcome risks that cannot be
minimised.
Infrastructure
• Need for some level of government commit-
ment to facilitate development at the
‘frontier’ stage to support the development
of new infrastructure, expertise and
investment due to the high infrastructure
costs for new industries;
• Need to develop scientific, engineering and
technical skills to enable rapid response to
new frontier opportunities – despite the
significant economic potential, none of the
Universities in NZ have programmes
dedicated to addressing new opportunities
like wave & tidal or gas hydrates.
Resource Data
• Need for better access to accurate and up
to date resource and site data as the key
driver to increasing industry activity;
• Need for more intensive mapping of site,
resource and reserve data - should be
considered a national priority due to the
strategic and economic value of the data to
NZ;
• Need for a closer alignment between
science and engineering research to focus
on developing potential solutions to
specific opportunities rather than undertak-
ing scientific research with limited or
isolated application.
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3.3  Context For Policy
Development
A  “Frontier Territories” and “Frontier
Activities”
The concept of the Ocean as a “Frontier
Territory” is the fundamental theme emerging
from the investigation and should be consid-
ered a central tenet in the development of the
new Oceans Policy framework.
The case studies developed for this Report are,
(were in the case of Maui), classic “Frontier
activities”, characterised by
• Significant technical risk;
• High start-up costs;
• Gaps in policy, governance and manage-
ment regimes (at least at frontier level);
and
• A long / convoluted / complex / uncertain
path to market in the early stages of the
industry.
While this point may seem obvious, it is an
important contextual consideration that is too
often overlooked as policy development all too
often lags economic development require-
ments.
Production from the Maui oil and gas field took
10 years from its initial discovery and required
the pioneering of an offshore gas production
system in New Zealand (an activity that was
then novel elsewhere in the world), new
structural designs, new onshore infrastructure,
new ‘enabling’ policies (energy self sufficiency,
empowering legislation, Take-Or-Pay agreement
etc) and new utilisation opportunities for the
gas (e.g. synthetic fuels, methanol, other
chemical derivatives, thermal fuels for power
generation, LGP, CNG etc) to facilitate its
economic development. While this process was
consistent with international practice at the
time, its application in New Zealand was
‘unique’.
Oil & Gas exploration is the definitive frontier
activity in New Zealand. Exploration activity
occurs despite:
• Often limited geophysical information
available for the permit area (which
increases risk and costs);
• High prospecting costs (up to $100m to
effect all of the work required to identify an
offshore prospect and test it by drilling);
and
• Low success rates (9 out of 10 prospecting
wells drilled may be ‘dry’ holes despite
promising seismic data).
The future development of a Gas Hydrates
industry is likely to share most if not all of the
features of both current oil and gas explora-
tion, and the economic development of Maui.
Current investment is limited to publicly-funded
research. Although not a newly discovered
resource, its potential as a significant energy
source and economic opportunity is yet to be
firmly established. However, the technical
complexities involved in mining, processing
and transportation of the hydrates in a useable
form to market will mimic the conditions faced
by New Zealand’s embryonic exploration
industry in Taranaki up to the Kapuni discovery
in 1959, and in the development of Maui in the
1970’s, but on a significantly larger scale.  The
enabling legislative steps were taken well in
advance (Petroleum Act 1937; Continental Shelf
Act 1964) of first commercial exploitation.
Consideration should be given now to the
adequacy of the enabling framework for future
sectors such as wave and tidal energy, which is
simply subjected to the blunt instrument of the
RMA and faced with a turbulent electricity
sector regulatory regime; and the gas hydrate
potential, for which the Crown Minerals Act
may prove similarly sub-optimal.
The embryonic wave & tidal energy industry in
New Zealand also shares many of the charac-
teristics of a ‘frontier’ activity - generation
technology is still at an early stage of develop-
ment and largely unproven. The novelty of the
proposed activity in New Zealand is expected
to result in delays in the consent application
process, and niche markets will need to be
identified and developed for an energy source
that is projected to cost 3-4 times more per
kWh than wind power.
The Commercial development of Frontier
Opportunities WILL require:
• A high return to match the high risk
At its most fundamental level, the develop-
ment of economic opportunities in New
Zealand’s ocean territory will require a
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strong business case, in particular, a return
commensurate with the perceived level of
risk involved.
The economic production of the Maui field
required a high degree of certainty over the
sale of a large quantity of gas for a
sustained period of time. This certainty was
provided by the Take-or-Pay Agreement
entered into by the Government of the
time, which obliged the Crown to purchase
the agreed volume of gas over a 30-year
period, irrespective of whether the gas
could be utilised at the time it had to be
paid for. In consideration of this, the
Government gained a 50% share in the
field. This intervention supported the
economic development of Maui by offset-
ting the sovereign risk against a property
right.
The Gas Hydrates case supports the
greatest potential economic return to the
country but carries the highest risk due to
the technical complexities of extraction,
transportation and production, along with
environmental concerns that are still to be
researched and are some considerable way
from being resolved. While Japan has an
annual gas hydrates R&D budget of
ES$50m per annum, New Zealand’s effort is
limited to the activities of one small
scientific team led by Dr Ingo Pecher at
GNS in Wellington.
Given New Zealand’s current vulnerabilities
in respect of future thermal fuels supply
(consideration of LNG importation is
currently underway) and substantial
indigenous sources of gas hydrate, a strong
case could be made for a quantum increase
in research effort towards expanding the
excellent geoscience base in this country
and complementing it with technological
and environmental lines of enquiry.  A
dedicated agency, similar to the LFTB of the
Maui era, may well be justified.
In the Exploration sector, the Risk-Return
hurdle is also extremely high as an offshore
prospecting programme may cost between
NZ$7m and $10m over the term of the
permit.  The substantial arrangements in
place in respect of oil and gas exploration,
which in recent years have expanded with
such specific instruments as frontier basin
seismic surveys, and the enhancement of
systems to provide existing exploration
data at low or no cost, are intended to
reduce risk and increase exploration
activity.  With the progressive depletion of
Maui and other developed fields in
Taranaki, New Zealand’s exploration sector
needs to be increasingly focussed on
frontier areas. Success in such areas will
raise infrastructural and potentially environ-
mental issues that have been successfully
addressed in Taranaki over the course of
several decades.  The Taranaki experience
should be able to be adapted effectively to
those regions where the industry proves
successful in the future, so that the value
of discoveries can be maximised.
The Risk-Return hurdle in wave and tidal
energy is much lower than for hydrocarbons
but is no less significant. The development
of the wave and tidal energy industry is
likely to struggle to become established
until generation costs are reduced (cur-
rently estimated at 3-4 times the cost of
wind per kWh due to technology costs) and
next generation technology becomes
available.
Besides the project sponsor, the costs and
benefits of an operational wave or tidal
power scheme will be borne locally and
regionally.  Pioneering development might
best be catalysed by facilitation by local or
regional interests, including local govern-
ment but also potentially economic
development agencies, lines companies
and/or iwi entities. This route to commer-
cialisation could well facilitate or promote
project development through providing
access to designated (non-consent) sites
and guaranteed production revenue.
The High Risk-High Return argument has
also been used to explain the lack of
current activity in the offshore mining of
manganese nodules. Despite innovative
‘enabling’ technology currently being
available (which was demonstrated at the
1999 CAE Conference at Te Papa), the world
price for manganese at present or for the
foreseeable future doesn’t justify commer-
cial production.
• An Internationally Competitive Risk &
Return Scenario
New Zealand is both reliant on the capital
and expertise of multinational companies in
the commercial development of ocean
opportunities (e.g. gas and oil) and
exposed to the global market for these
vital components of the commercialisation
process. In this respect, the global market
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may be both a threat and an opportunity
for emergent industries in New Zealand.
On a negative note, New Zealand is ranked
only 14th in the world in attractiveness to
exploration investment6. This ranking is
due to the predominance of gas rather than
oil in the Basins, the low price for gas in
New Zealand due to the historic surplus
from Maui and a small domestic market,
distance to other markets and related
logistics costs, and lower prospectivity than
other regions in the world. A number of
government initiatives have been launched
to increase exploration activity, including a
$15m programme to acquire seismic data
and as well as a database development
project to provide access to this data to
exploration companies.
On a positive note, however, there are
indications that New Zealand’s low popula-
tion density and vigorous wave and tidal
environment are attracting overseas wave &
tidal energy technology developers. Two
respondents to this study indicated
approaches by European technology
companies who were unable to secure
access to suitable sites in their home
countries and were interested in partnering
up with New Zealand companies to demon-
strate and prove their technology here. This
is perhaps an opportunity for government
intervention to assist in overcoming the
risk hurdle the incumbents face, develop
the local industry by expediting access to
new technology and also capitalise on a
potential international scientific and
economic opportunity.
It has been suggested that New Zealand
could capitalise on the opportunity through
the development of a “marine energy
technology incubation park”, with research
and pilot facilities that would facilitate the
plugging-in of new technologies for testing
or demonstration purposes.
• The First Frontier Projects are Never Fully
Commercial
As demonstrated by Maui and other
projects internationally such as Wave Hub
UK and EMAC (wave & tidal energy), some
level of government assistance at an early
stage is central to the development of new
frontier industries.
At its optimal level, government interven-
tions will assist in the development of
these frontier industries by providing
certainty and confidence to pioneers by
minimising completion risk, i.e. the risk of
a project failing due to the incapacity of
the sponsor to complete the development
stage or other factors outside the immedi-
ate control of the pioneer, including
sovereign risk or more broadly, retrospec-
tive application of new legislation or shifts
in government policies.
• The Level of Intervention should be
Commensurate with the Risk-Return profile
of the Opportunity
The successful development and production
of the Maui gas and oil field required a 30-
year commitment by the government (as
the only possible purchaser due to factors
underlying the economic development of
the field) to purchase an agreed volume of
gas at an agreed price irrespective of
utilisation
The economic development of the gas
hydrates opportunity may require a similar
level of commitment, perhaps even on a
larger scale, due to the complexities of
discovery, development and production
demonstrated by the high levels of gas
hydrate R&D being undertaken by Japan,
the US and Canada, which New Zealand is
in no position to emulate. Japan in particu-
lar is striving to achieve a target of com-
mercial production of gas hydrates by 2013.
Despite the huge economic potential of gas
hydrates to the country, New Zealand is not
in a position to match the level of funding
by Japan, the US and Canada. However, the
case study has indicated that New Zealand
researchers are implementing, and are
continuing to develop, ‘smart’ ways of
leveraging their available contribution to
these international efforts, and in doing so,
sharing the results of the international R&D
activities.
Anecdotal evidence from respondents
suggests that increasing New Zealand
researchers’ visibility and participation at
international conferences is an extremely
cost effective mechanism for increasing
scientific collaboration. (In one case cited,
participation at an international conference
which cost the host organisation under
NZ$5,000, has since led to an exchange
programme and invitations to the host
organisation to participate in a fully funded
6 “The Oil & Gas Market In New Zealand: A Sector
Summary”, UK Trade & Industry
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survey of one of the gas hydrate zones in
New Zealand in approximately 12 months
time. The opportunity cost of otherwise
purchasing participation would be in the
hundreds of thousands.)
While we applaud the approaches being
taken by the respondents and other
members of the New Zealand scientific
community the study team wishes to
caution that such activities should be
driven by strategic game plans rather than
short-term science objectives.
In contrast to the above, exploration and
the wave and tidal sectors are nearer term
opportunities and interventions are, or
should be, scaled accordingly to achieve a
primary objective of minimising ‘opportu-
nity costs’ to both the pioneers and the
New Zealand economy from delays to the
development of the industry.
While a wide range of interventions is
currently available to the exploration sector,
including tax incentives and adjustments to
the royalty regime and free access to
seismic data, wave & tidal proponents have
limited support. This is perhaps not
unexpected given the emergent nature of
the industry and the lack of capital forma-
tion within the current industry grouping
but, importantly, suggests a need for some
facilitative action from government.
 Interventions suggested by the respond-
ents included MfE facilitation of the
development of a Code of Practice for the
industry, sponsorship of a test case of this
Code of Practice through the Environment
Court to identify the issues involved in
securing resource consent for this new and
novel activity, funding for more site and
resource data research, and further research
to gauge the feasibility of developing a
“marine energy technology incubation park”
in New Zealand. The two marine parks in
Europe (Wave Hub in the United Kingdom
and EMAC in Portugal) have allowed the
wave & tidal energy industry there to
develop at a faster rate than would have
been possible without the facilities.
It has been suggested that a New Zealand
marine energy technologies incubation
park,  should it be viable, would provide a
number of benefits, including:
• Providing New Zealand with advance
access to new technologies;
• Opportunities to test and
demonstrate new technologies under
New Zealand conditions;
• Capacity building opportunities across
the sector.
B Development of Frontier
Opportunities will require New
Zealand to compete internationally
for investment and expertise
All the case studies presented are character-
ised as ‘frontier’ activities by a dependence on
the capital, resources and know-how of
multinational companies. This dependence is
the result, among other things, of New Zea-
land’s small economy being unable to provide
the high levels of R&D funding and investment
required to develop these frontier opportuni-
ties, or support a permanent pool of indig-
enous expertise.
Unfortunately (for New Zealand), multinational
companies make their business decisions
within a global context and in many cases, it is
inevitable that opportunities in other parts of
the work will prove more attractive for invest-
ment than particular opportunities in New
Zealand, for some combination of 3 key factors
– acceptable returns on investment, acceptable
levels of risk and certainty of completion.
All three factors are within the scope of
government intervention and the appropriate
mechanism to do so will be a policy framework
that balances the risk return equation to
provide pioneers with an acceptable rate of
return which does not compromise competition
in the frontier activity and at the same time,
also explicitly supports and incentivises the
identification and commercial development of
new and novel economic opportunities.
Suitable generic policy instruments could
include ‘flow-through’ tax concessions which
would allow tax losses from frontier activities
to be offset against the tax liabilities of
investors in such projects, ‘bounties’ to reward
the first successful fully commercial projects in
specific frontier industries, and the develop-
ment and testing of Codes of Practice for new
frontier activities at an early stage of the
industry, i.e. before they become commercially
necessary.
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C The commercial development of
Frontier Opportunities will
inevitably challenge conventional
resource law and governance
The identification of new and unique opportu-
nities in frontier territories, and the drivers for
their commercialisation, often emerge well in
advance of relevant governing policy because
conventional policy development is concerned
with managing risk, and is therefore generally
more reactive rather than proactive and tends
to focus on known or existing (quantifiable)
activities.
However, frontier activities are by their very
nature, pioneering endeavours undertaken in
the unknown, with longer-term commercial time
horizons and higher risk tolerances than
‘Business-As-Usual’ projects in established
industries (e.g. Japan’s US$50m/pa gas hy-
drates R&D budget to achieve commercial
production by 2016).
Consequently, the study team has formed a
view that in order for Oceans Policy to be
supportive of frontier activities, it must give
effect to the principle that there should be
tolerance of risk commensurate with the
uncertainty prevalent in frontier activities
posed by the lack of information. Frontier
opportunities are activities for which consider-
able allowances are made to the conventional
business case evaluation process because
there is insufficient data about the specific
opportunity and even more critically, a lack of
knowledge regarding potential consequences,
BUT where the potential returns from success-
ful development can justify this latitude. Our
argument is that without greater tolerance for
risk, pioneers may be unwilling to develop
these opportunities, ultimately to the detriment
of the New Zealand economy.
We accept that this is at odds with the domi-
nant paradigm but believe that it is consistent
with international best practice and the science
of risk management.
3.4  Recommended
Interventions
The successful governance of frontier territory
opportunities will require a policy framework
that:
• Is based on Clear Principles to provide
Continuity and Consistency to Pioneers and
Developers
• Manages With Risk, rather than attempting
to Manage Risk
• Maximises the Opportunity Value to New
Zealand of the resource opportunities
• Actively provides for and supports the
emergence of Entrepreneurial and Pioneer-
ing activity.
The Ministry’s key contribution to the develop-
ment of the case study (and other appropriate)
industries may well be the leadership and
facilitation role it can play in:
a. Facilitating the advance development of
consent protocols / codes of practice for
specific new and novel activities and in
taking test cases through to the Environ-
ment Court in order to identify and resolve
issues before the protocols are needed
commercially;
b. Facilitating consistent and standardised
application of policy across the country.
One opportunity would be to develop a
training programme around the Taranaki
Regional Council’s extensive expertise and
experience in processing offshore consent
applications for all the other regional
councils;
c. Facilitating better communication and
understanding of the RMA and success
stories to both reduce uncertainty and
prevent the small number of negative
stories to evolve into urban myth. In the
wave & tidal energy industry, in particular,
we note that participants reported RMA
hurdles impacting on their business without
having verified them or sought external
advice;
d. Facilitating the development of a wide skills
base that would support the commercialisa-
tion of new, novel and undiscovered
opportunities by:
• Encouraging Universities to expand their
existing academic programmes to
include relevant learning modules for
near term opportunities in the oceans
arena;
• Encouraging linkages with best-of-breed
programmes and researchers at other
academic institutions; and,
• Encouraging a closer alignment between
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science and engineering research, as
both fields complement each other and
are central to the development of
potential solutions.
At a broad policy level, the following sugges-
tions should be considered:
e. Allocation regimes need to both incentivise
commercial development of opportunities
and also sanction applicants who act as
speculators or squatters on resource
opportunities (as seen in the aquaculture
sector);
f. The inclusion of more flexibility in manage-
ment and consent regimes to reflect the
embryonic state of the case study indus-
tries (with their focus on R&D, proof-of-
concept, technology demonstration and site
evaluation, rather than commercial deploy-
ment) and allow for better scaling of
consent requirements to the scope of
projects;
g. There needs to be greater consideration of
the impact of jurisdictional boundaries
(particularly between regional councils) on
near shore activities compared to frontier
activities undertaken beyond the terrirotial
limits.
3.5  Summary &
Conclusions
The principal theme emerging from this
investigation is that the New Zealand’s Exclu-
sive Economic Zone and its continental shelf
extensions should be considered as “Frontier
Territory” as these areas are basically “un-
charted”. As a country we are only just begin-
ning to understand the marine environment,
the ocean process that operate within these
boundaries and the resource potential that lies
within. As this understanding grows and
knowledge increases, it is inevitable that new
resource opportunities will present themselves.
We argue that to capitalise on these emergent
opportunities, it is appropriate to accept a
higher risk tolerance in respect of commercial
development activity and that focus should be
given to policies and practices that are
adaptive to the risk circumstances in this
context.
This is reflected in the case studies seemingly
characterised by gaps in resource information,
high upstream investment requirements
(exploration and prospecting, site evaluation,
resource mapping, new pre-commercial
technology), a “first in first served” allocation
regime if one is available, the absence of a
specific management regime for commercialisa-
tion of the resources, and the need for new
infrastructure, among others.
The respondents to this investigation are
aware that as “trailblazers” or pioneers, they
will be exposed to the high costs of creating
precedents with the relevant regional and
Crown authorities, of pioneering consent and
other regulatory protocols and processes, of
developing infrastructure, and quantifying and
qualifying economic opportunities, only to have
the threat of “free riders” and speculators
swooping in on the back of their efforts to
obtain occupancy and use rights to resources
that they have sought to secure for them-
selves. They are also aware that as new or
novel activities, governmental policies impact-
ing on their businesses could be applied
retrospectively at anytime.
CAE suggest that the following policy consid-
erations should be deliberated on in the
development of Oceans Policy so as to encour-
age the development of new and novel
opportunities in New Zealand’s oceans and to
support the transformation of their embryonic
industries into mature industries contributing
significantly to the national economy:
1. “New Zealand’s Economic Future lies in its
Oceans” – the diminishing of terrestrial
resources will focus attention on develop-
ing new economic opportunities in the
Oceans. Oceans Policy must be flexible
enough to allow new opportunities to be
developed in a cost effective manner with
all due regard to applicable allocation,
governance and management regimes.
2. “The Ocean is Frontier Territory” – Oceans
Policy should reflect the fact that ‘frontier
activities’ are unique because they will
involve significant technical risk, high costs
and a long uncertain complex pathway to
market in the early stages of the develop-
ment of the industries. Ocean Policy should
also be cognizant of the fact that pioneers
are operating in a dearth of information, in
hazardous conditions and have to react
quickly to both hazards and opportunities.
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3. “Frontier Opportunities are Business
Development Opportunities” - without an
appropriate business case, and a return
commensurate with the risk involved, there
isn’t a viable opportunity for policy to
support.
4. “Risk And Return, Opportunity Costs and
the Time Value of Money are the key
drivers to the Development of Frontier
Opportunities” – frontier opportunities are
by necessity speculative ones. Long-term
opportunities are likely to be driven by
risk-return considerations, while immediate
and near term opportunities will be driven
by the opportunity costs and time value of
money. The provision of ‘certainty’ through
policy is thus especially crucial for near
term opportunities where the commercial
viability of a pioneering project is particu-
larly sensitive to delays and impediments
to the business plan.
5. “New Zealand Ocean Opportunities Must Be
both Nationally and Internationally Com-
petitive” - the commercial development of
opportunities in New Zealand will require
competitive business cases firstly, because
New Zealand is dependent on multinational
companies, who operate in a global market
for their capital, expertise and resources;
and secondly, because local markets need
to be established to support the develop-
ment of infrastructure, supply chains etc for
economic production.
6. “Early Projects in Frontier Industries are
Rarely Fully Commercial” - The first few
projects in ‘frontier industries’ have
historically benefited from a level of
government intervention to clarify policy
principles, formalise property rights,
establish certainty and reduce completion
risk, among other things.
7. “Frontier Projects require Flexible and
Discretionary Policy Frameworks” – policy
elements that control established industries
may not be appropriate for embryonic or
emergent industries. Under the current RMA
regime it is apparent that the scope of
required reporting, investigation costs and
timeframes required for planning approvals
are disproportionate to the scale of early
stage projects; being predominantly
technology demonstration and evaluation
projects.
8. “Policy Frameworks for Frontier Activities
must be based on Clear Principles” – clear
principles will provide certainty to pioneers;
and the clearer the principle, the sooner an
opportunity is likely to be commercialised.
9. “Policy Frameworks for Frontier Activities
must maximise the Opportunity Value to
New Zealand” – this includes ensuring
sufficiently robust policy mechanisms are in
place to balance, among other things, the
natural desire by pioneers for monopolies
versus the government’s role to promote
and support competition.
10.  “Conventional Policy Frameworks must
and should apply once an industry is
established” - the availability of infrastruc-
ture and supply chains to support the
commercialisation of a frontier opportunity
generally indicate the difference between a
mature and an emergent industry.
3.6  Issues For Further
Investigation
The study team has posited a view that
encouraging the sustainable development of
new economic opportunities in New Zealand’s
Ocean Territory will require both their treatment
as ‘frontier opportunities’ as well their manage-
ment under a policy framework that will
manage with risk rather than attempt to
manage all risks inherent in frontier activities.
The development of a policy framework that
“manages with risk” will require further
investigation into the following issues:
1. What are the underlying issues to the
adoption of a risk based approach?
2. What are the optimal levels of “risk
tolerance” for new economic opportunities
in New Zealand’s Oceans, which would
actively support, encourage and incentivise
the development for new marine opportuni-
ties without imposing undue risk or fiscal
burdens on the New Zealand economy as
the development of Maui has been found
to have done?
3. What are the optimal balance points
between providing pioneers with sufficient
incentives to investigate and develop
frontier opportunities while ensuring
sufficient competition to maximise the
opportunity value to the New Zealand
economy?
4. Should work programmes be a standard
requirement for all new frontier activities?
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Work programmes could address the issues
faced in the aquaculture allocation model
in which speculators were able to lock up
optimal aquaculture sites through the
consent process without any intention of
utilising the resource directly themselves.
5. The results of these investigations could
then provide the basis for a focused Risk
Management Framework for Offshore
Frontier Activities.
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CASE STUDY No 1: 
THE DISCOVERY, DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF THE MAUI 
GAS & OIL FIELD 
a. Introduction 
The Maui gas field is located 35km offshore of the Taranaki Peninsula (see Fig 1) in water 
depth of 110m1. In 1969, it was the eighth largest gas field discovered in the world to date, 
with reserves of gas estimated at approximately 3830 billion cubic feet.  
 
Fig 1. Taranaki Basin Petroleum fields (source: Crown Minerals, Ministry for Economic Development) 
 
Production commenced in 1979, 10 years after discovery. Reasons for the delay included the 
technical complexities of developing the field, infrastructure design parameters that were 
beyond anything previously attempted, and also because development of offshore gas fields 
was, at that stage, still novel on a world wide basis and completely unknown in NZ.  
Additionally, the economic production of the Maui field required the producers to secure a 
committed sale of a large quantity of gas over an extended period of time. The New Zealand 
government was the only possible buyer for such a large quantity of gas and entered into the 
Take-or-Pay Agreement that committed it to purchase gas from the field for a 30-year period. 
In consideration of this, the NZ Government gained 50% ownership of the field. 
Production on the Maui Field is from 3 reservoirs within separate formations of the Kapuni 
Group. The Maui-A platform wells commenced production in 1979, while Maui-B came on 
stream in 1993. 34 wells have since been drilled in the field as of 2003, consisting of 14 
production wells within Maui-A and 12 development wells within Maui-B, along with a further 8 
exploration/appraisal wells. 
Maui accounts for between 75%2 and 80%3 of New Zealand’s hydrocarbon production. 
Annual production from the year to June 2002 was: 
ß 168 bcf (Billion cubic feet) of gas 
                                                
1 Taranaki Basin Producing Fields, MED pg 22 
2 Economic Opportunities In New Zealand’s Oceans (2003); Centre For Advanced Engineering for the Oceans Policy 
Secretariat; p3 
3 Taranaki Basin Producing Fields, MED pg 23 
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ß 6 mmbbl (million barrels) of oil and condensate 
ß 168,000 metric tonnes of LPG4 
Since commencing production in 1979, Maui has made a massive contribution to the New 
Zealand economy. In addition to providing approximately 50% of the (relatively cheap) fuel 
used for electricity generation, it has also contributed an estimated $472m directly5, excluding 
revenue to the government from other downstream activities, e.g. Methanex.  
Production from field reduced in 2003, following a downwards revision of the size of the 
reserve and is expected that the specified economic reserves will be depleted sometime after 
2008. Projections are that additional reserves will be delineated to enable additional 
production that could well extend this timeframe6. 
The decline of the Maui field may prove to be a double edged sword for the New Zealand 
economy. While the low price of gas from Maui has contributed significantly to New Zealand’s 
international competitiveness by allowing the government to attract large multinational 
companies like Methanex and in the South Island, Comalco, by providing them with low cost 
electricity contracts over a long term. On the downside, it has also suppressed the 
commercialisation of new gas field discoveries (particularly Kupe, discovered in 1986 and with 
first production now scheduled for 2008) and disincentivised exploration, because the Maui 
gas prices made concurrent production from other fields uneconomic.  
b. Factors Supporting the Development of the Maui Gas & oil field 
Know How 
ß Shell-BP-Todd (SBPT) as well as Mobil, Gulf Oil, Hunt and Exxon undertook marine 
seismic surveys during the 1960’s and early 1970’s as the technology became widely 
available;  
ß The first offshore drilling campaign based on seismic data led to the Maui discovery; 
Capital 
ß Cooperation between Shell, BP and the NZ company Todd enabled them to leverage off 
each individual company’s strengths to discover and develop the field - the previous 
onshore discovery at Kapuni was the culmination of a joint venture to systematically 
explore the most prospective parts of New Zealand, with Shell operating the western side 
of the country and BP the eastern; 
ß Government stepped in to promote and facilitate the development of Maui during a period 
when energy security and affordability was (as again today) very high on the political 
agenda globally.  However, even with governments of both parties persuaded of the 
desirability of facilitation and commercial involvement on an unprecedented scale, the 
path from discovery to development took 10 years. 
Clear Title 
ß The Continental Shelf Act 1964 vested ownership of resources of the Continental Shelf 
with the NZ Government; and extended the reach of the Petroleum Act 1937 over the 
newly gazetted territory. 
c. Barriers 
ß The main barrier to the development of the field was the lack of a ready market for the 
production of gas on the scale required for commercial development;  
ß There were also a number of technical and technological hurdles that had to be 
addressed, as offshore gas production was unknown in New Zealand and relatively novel 
elsewhere in the world at the time. 
                                                
4 Economic Opportunities In New Zealand’s Oceans (2003); ibid; p3 
5 Economic Opportunities In New Zealand’s Oceans (2003); ibid; p3 
6 Hooper, RJ, “Medium Term Vulnerabilities Within The New Zealand Gas Market”, Paper to New Zealand Petroleum 
Conference 2006:p8. 
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d. Interventions 
ß The Take-Or-Pay Agreement entered to by the government enabled the commercial 
development of the field by securing the sale of a fixed volume of gas to the government 
irrespective of whether it was, or could be, utilised;  
ß The development of a market for Maui gas in New Zealand was facilitated by massive 
predominantly government investment into the development of infrastructure for 
processing, transportation and consumption (power generation, synthetic petrol etc);   
ß Government also took an active lead, through the Liquid Fuels Trust Board, Power 
Planning Committee and the Department of Trade and Industry among others, to develop 
utilisation options for the gas; 
Summary & Conclusions 
Think Big gave government intervention a bad name.  
However its failures largely arose from the collapse of oil price negating the underpinning 
case for self-sufficiency.  While much attention has been given to the negative outcomes 
associated with this fundamental impact on specific business cases, nevertheless the 
development of Maui has had a large and widely distributed positive effect on the 
competitiveness of the New Zealand economy due to its sustaining of competitive energy 
prices, enjoyed by manufacturing and other industries.  For example, Taranaki was until 2003 
one of the most efficient sites for methanol production in the world.   
More importantly however, the establishment of a viable gas industry in New Zealand was 
only made possible by the infrastructure that was established and the gas market that 
subsequently ensued. The Gas industry remains an important contributor to national GDP.  
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CASE STUDY No 2: OIL & GAS EXPLORATION IN NEW ZEALAND 
a. Introduction 
The modern era of exploration in NZ began in New Zealand in 1955 when Shell and BP 
established New Zealand’s first major consortium with the Todd Brothers of Wellington. Their 
acquisition and analysis of the first seismic data shot in New Zealand led eventually to the 
discovery of the Kapuni Field (264bcf of gas reserves) in 1959 and Maui in 1969 (3830bcf of 
gas reserves), who together produce approximately 83% of New Zealand’s oil and 87% of its 
gas production.  
The commencement of production from Kapuni in 1970 marked the beginning of the natural 
gas industry in New Zealand, and Taranaki as the hub of New Zealand’s oil and gas industry.  
Although Taranaki is the most explored and commercially successful of the NZ Basins (with 
350 exploration wells drilled to date), it is still relatively under-explored by world standards. 
Increasing levels of exploration over recent years has led to an enviable success rate for 
wildcat drilling and a commercial discovery success rate of one in three in the Taranaki Basin 
based on recent exploration activity7, while offshore discoveries have also been very 
successful commencing with Pohokura in 2000, and Tui and Karewa in 2003. 
 
Fig 2: Hydrocarbon Basins in New Zealand’s EEZ (Source: Crown Minerals, Ministry of Economic Development)  
 
New Zealand is currently rated 14th in the world in terms of attractiveness to oil and gas 
investment8. As the business process for investment is driven entirely by oil company 
investment and know-how, exploration investment and activity in New Zealand is limited 
primarily by the risk perceptions established by oil companies in a highly competitive global 
market, rather than resource potential9.  
                                                
7 “Petroleum Systems Of New Zealand”, Crown Minerals (1991) - 
http://www.crownminerals.govt.nz/petroleum/systems/index.html 
8 “The Oil And Gas Market in New Zealand: A Sector Summary”; UK Dept. of  Trade & Industry; p7. 
9 Economic Opportunities In New Zealand’s Oceans (2003); ibid; p4 
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However, New Zealand’s ranking may change as exploration activity in NZ is expected to 
increase dramatically in the near future due to: 
ß The impending depletion of Maui, that will drive the need for new discoveries as a result 
of New Zealand’s heavy dependence on gas including for electricity generation, with 
around 50% of total national gas production used to generate 23% of the national energy 
supply;  
ß The incentives for new discoveries, due to rising gas prices (200% in the past 3 years) 
inline with the run down of production at Maui in addition to global sector profitability due 
to high oil prices, peak oil concerns and Middle East instability; 
ß Shell’s withdrawal from 2004 from all prospecting in Australasia, which is expected to 
make NZ more attractive to smaller exploration companies by reducing competition for 
prospecting permits;  
ß The potential for significant commercial hydrocarbon discoveries in the 7 additional 
Sedimentary Basins besides Taranaki that have been severely under-explored. Many 
untested structural closures could be potentially larger than the Maui field; 
ß A lack of alternatives to gas fuelled electricity generation due to the New Zealand public’s 
resistance to coal-fired power plants, new hydroelectric dams and nuclear-power stations, 
which will create unique opportunities for exploration companies to create value when gas 
demand, with its associated pricing, is at its maximum and energy alternatives are at a 
minimum. 
 
Fig 2. New Zealand Natural Gas Supply & Demand [Source: TAG Oil (NZ) Ltd] 
 
b. Reported Barriers 
The business case process for oil and gas exploration is mature, key sensitivities include field 
(prospect) size, flow rate, costs, timing and prices.  Despite the positive factors supporting the 
development and expansion of the exploration sector in New Zealand, a number of issues 
were raised by respondents as potential barriers, or causes of curtailment, to their activities.  
a. TECHNOLOGY & EQUIPMENT 
ß Global scarcity and heavy bookings for specialist equipment was reported as one of 
the main barriers to the respondents expanding their future exploration activities in 
NZ. Supply of rigs worldwide is tightening as international exploration increases in 
response to high oil prices.  
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ß Although 14th in the world in terms of attractiveness to oil and gas investment10, New 
Zealand is also becoming less attractive as a prospecting destination than some 
other parts of the world due to a predominance of gas rather than oil in the New 
Zealand sedimentary structures.   
ß The scarcity of specialist equipment is contributing to difficulties experienced by the 
respondents in aligning the completion of work programme commitments with 
equipment availability within the permit time frames. 
ß Cost of equipment was also cited as limiting factor for future exploration, especially in 
areas of lower prospectivity. Rig costs have increased from $70,000/day in 2003-04, 
to $128,000/day in 2005-06, to a projected $378,000/day for 2007-08. 
ß Demands for work programmes of 12 months or longer from rig operators may also 
contribute to the ongoing scarcity of specialist equipment for New Zealand exploration 
activities as the small NZ exploration industry would struggle to support such a 
commitment in the absence of a “primary contractor” willing to underwrite a 12 month 
rig programme.     
b. POLICY: Permit Regime And Work Programmes 
ß Respondents raised concerns about the ‘aggressiveness’ of the current permit 
regime, in particular the difficulties they faced in aligning the requirements of their 
respective work programmes with the availability of rigs and other equipment, within 
in their permit timeframes.   
ß Respondents suggested more flexibility in or extensions to permit terms may be 
required as the worldwide demand for specialist equipment is increasing the time 
horizon to relocate rigs to New Zealand beyond 2 years. Exploration permits currently 
run on a 2-year rolling system. 
ß In conjunction with their inability to meet their work programme requirements due to 
non-availability of equipment, respondents also cited difficulties in securing 
deferments to their Work Programmes from Crown Minerals as an additional barrier 
to an expansion of their exploration activity.  
ß Lack of access to exploration acreage was also raised as an issue, despite the 
previous bid round being significantly under subscribed.  
c. POLICY: Resource Management Act 
ß Inconsistencies in the treatment and processing of resource consents by different 
councils was reported as being of concern, especially when it impacted on the 
respondents’ abilities to either plan for or meet their Work Programme commitments. 
Most regional councils are generally focused on consent protocols for onshore / land 
based projects, and only Taranaki was reported to have high quality in-house RMA 
expertise for offshore projects.  
ß Exploration permits and activities that crossed territorial boundaries increased the 
scope and scale of the consent application process, which compounded the 
inconsistent treatment reported above. 
d. FISCAL REGIME & INCENTIVES: 
ß Currently, tax incentives are only available for new gas discoveries only. However, 
respondents suggested that the incentives should be applied for both types of 
hydrocarbons as oil and gas are generally found together and NZ has greater 
dependence on oil. 
ß Respondents also suggested that the incentive regime be applied to the development 
of previous discoveries, which may now be more economic to produce with the 
demise of Maui. 
ß Respondents also questioned the implications of the recent initiative by IRD to 
remove the tax obligations on survey ships and rigs operating in New Zealand 
                                                
10 The Oil & Gas Market in New Zealand: A Sector Summary; UK Dept. Trade & Industry: p7 
 Sustainable Development of NZ’s Ocean Resources Report  Page 35  
beyond the 186-day exemption period while maintaining the obligation on rig support 
vessels. Respondents pointed out that rigs operate symbiotically with support vessels 
and this initiative could increase both the cost of drilling programmes and lead to 
potential delays due to non-availability of the rigs. 
e. RESOURCE INFORMATION 
ß Respondents cited ‘prospectivity’ as the greater driver for exploration activity than the 
availability of infrastructure in proximity to new discoveries, and shared their 
experiences of difficulties in accessing seismic data purchased by the Crown for this 
purpose. These experiences have not been reported here because it was the 
consensus of participants at the Workshop that the opinions expressed weren’t valid. 
ß Recent government initiatives to increase prospectivity and provide access to the 
seismic data include: 
o The NZ$15m MED programme commencing in 2005 to acquire data in frontier 
basins, in conjunction with a database project that will provide free online access 
to both old and new exploration data11; 
o A NZ$23m FRST funded multidisciplinary programme in conjunction with GNS to 
undertake mapping, geological analysis and modelling of yet-to-be discovered 
petroleum accumulations to reduce exploration risk and increase exploration 
success for both established companies and new entrants12;   
f. INVESTMENT 
ß Respondents suggested that New Zealand’s attractiveness to international 
investment in exploration was limited by low prospectivity, a predominance of gas 
rather than oil in recent discoveries, its relatively small market size and distance to 
larger markets, and the historically low gas prices due to the oversupply of gas from 
Maui.  
ß The lack of a domestic exploration sector capable of completing frontier type activities 
unless in conjunction with international investment. Above the relatively small scale of 
Austral Pacific and NZOG, only Todd (as a domestic company) has created a linkage 
with overseas companies to drive offshore exploration in New Zealand. However, 
these multinational companies operate globally and tend to come and go as more 
competitive opportunities emerge elsewhere. 
g. INFRASTRUCTURE 
ß Some respondents reported that although their exploration activities outside the 
Taranaki Basin had yielded discoveries, they were unable to commercialise their 
discoveries due to lack of infrastructure. However, it is worth noting that size of the 
discoveries did not justify government intervention to lead the development of new 
infrastructure that the discovery of Maui did.  
ß One respondent cited lack of access to existing pipeline infrastructure as the reason 
for his company’s inability to commercialise discoveries within Taranaki. The lack of 
access was reportedly for commercial reasons but the respondent chose not to 
discuss this further. It may be useful to investigate to what extent this is an issue for 
other exploration companies operating in the Taranaki Basin as it could conceivably 
be an uncompetitive practice. 
ß Respondents all supported government intervention to kick-start the development of 
infrastructure outside the Taranaki Basin as a means of encouraging and supporting 
exploration activity in the other Basins. However, we comment that this would first 
require the existence of a proven petroleum system sufficient to support such an 
investment, which is yet to be achieved. Internationally, government investments in 
infrastructure are typically linked to the development stage, not exploration. 
                                                
11 “Kiwi’s Help Exploration”; Hart’s E&Pnet.com, Jan ’06 - 
http://www.eandpnet.com/articles/newsAndComments/4187 
12 http://www.frst.govt.nz/Research/Success_Stories/Oil_and_Gas_Exploration.doc 
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c. Suggested Interventions 
1. Adjustments to the tax regime – exemptions for support ships, incentives for new oil 
and gas discoveries, incentives to developed existing discoveries. 
2. Strategies to attract small to medium sized international exploration companies – 
respondents suggested that exploration in New Zealand Basins is more suited to 
small to medium sized exploration companies, who are likely to be hungrier and more 
responsive to current government initiatives to boost exploration activity.  
3. Strategies to assist NZ companies to develop into world class operators – 
respondents highlighted the opportunity for government to assist local companies to 
be come internationally competitive as a result of anticipated local demand and high 
world prices.   
4. Strategies to increase the availability of specialist exploration equipment in NZ – 
respondents suggested that the Government might have a role as a ‘primary 
contractor’ or underwriter for an extended drilling programme. 
5. Adjustments to permit regime: 
ß Consideration of exit points - respondents suggested that a more flexible 
approach be implemented for the work programmes, in particular  
ß More flexibility in reasons for deferral other than rig non-availability  
The Study acknowledges that Government has already moved in part in the above areas by 
adjustments to taxation regimes and the provision of seismic data sets without condition to 
interested parties at no or limited cost. Our investigation suggests that more could be done to 
better match initiatives to the business interests of that targeted mid sized exploration 
companies. In respect of specialist exploration equipment, we suggest that there may well be 
a role for Government in underwriting rig programmes for extended periods and then 
tendering spare capacity to the industry. Such an initiative or similar scaled interventions will 
however, require further investigation. 
Summary & Conclusions 
The oil and gas industry in New Zealand is currently at a crossroad due to the depletion of 
Maui. In particular: 
ß It is an established industry with a tight geographical focus (the Taranaki Basin) 
facing a contracting gas market, competition from imported oil and gas and a high 
incidence of dry holes;  
ß Despite the drilling of almost 600 exploratory wells, it is still considered a ‘frontier 
territory’, with a well density of 1:14km2 in the Taranaki Basin that is considerably 
lower than other geologically similar regions around the world13;  
ß Successful discoveries (e.g. Pohokura) have been counter-cyclical and ‘lumpy’, 
causing strains to infrastructure and support services. 
The depletion of Maui is creating an energy shortfall for New Zealand and new opportunities 
for the industry, as exploration activity will need to be significantly increased in order to 
produce sufficient successful discoveries for appraisal and development to secure New 
Zealand’s energy system. For example, a recent article on the Foundation for Research 
Science & Technology’s website suggests that exploration intensity will need to increase by a 
minimum of 300% to come up with the discoveries to meet anticipated petroleum demand14.   
The Study Team suggests that the following issues, which were outside the current scope, 
will require further investigation: 
1. How should the sector cope with sub-optimal known discoveries (i.e. proven reserves 
that are either too small, too expensive or of uncertain quality to warrant extraction at 
current prices) through existing infrastructure and support services? 
                                                
13 UK Dept. of Trade & Industry website - http://www.uktradeinvest.co.nz/services/trade/sectors/oilandgas.htm 
14 “Success Story: In Pursuit Of Petroleum”; Foundation for Research Science & Technology - 
http://www.frst.govt.nz/research/Success_Stories/Oil_and_Gas_Exploration.cfm 
 Sustainable Development of NZ’s Ocean Resources Report  Page 37  
2. Assuming the stimulation of exploration activity through the current incentive 
programme, how should the sector cope with any resulting new discoveries that do 
not conform to the Maui ‘profile’ on which the existing infrastructure is optimised for, 
i.e. discoveries in new basins, discoveries with different mixes of oil and gas, 
discoveries of different sizes? 
3. Which government agency should take the lead in facilitating capacity development in 
the sector that would address the above?  
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CASE STUDY 3: ISSUES AND BARRIERS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A 
WAVE & TIDAL ENERGY INDUSTRY 
a. Introduction 
Marine Energy, often referred to as “Blue Energy”, is a renewable and sustainable energy 
resource with relatively limited impacts on the environment and marine life. Although the 
‘Marine Energy’ definition can encompass energy derived from offshore winds, ocean 
currents, heat and salinity exchange, and marine biomass conversion, the focus of this project 
is on devices to generate energy from wave action and tidal currents. 
New Zealand is particularly suited to wave & tidal energy production as it is surrounded by 
ocean, has a large wave energy resource in the western and southern coasts from waves 
generated in the Southern Ocean and Tasman Sea, significant tidal currents in Cook Strait, 
French Pass and Foveaux Strait, and a number of harbours (e.g. the Kaipara and Hokianga) 
with tidal movements.     
The concentration of the NZ population along the coastline also provides many potential 
opportunities for the deployment of wave & tidal devices as options for localised or distributed 
generation, supplanting the need for high cost transmission network upgrades.   
A recent EECA fact sheet on Marine Energy15 highlighted some additional commercial 
arguments for the deployment of wave & tidal energy devices, including the shorter 
transmission distances from localised utilisation, modular and incremental deployment options 
that minimise installation costs and capital requirements and the more rapid installation 
timeframes compared to hydro or thermal fuel plants (although this is not always the case).  
b. Wave and Tidal Devices 
Table 1: Types of Wave and Tidal Devices 
Wave Power System 
devices 
Generates energy by translating wave displacement into 
hydraulic force to rotate onshore turbines 
W
A
VE
 
Oscillating Water 
Column devices 
Generates energy when rising and falling waves move air in a 
fixed volume chamber, which rotates a turbine 
Barrage devices Generates energy by forcing water through turbines along a 
dam 
Tidal fences Generates energy when tidal currents rotate turnstiles along a 
fence stretching across a strait 
TI
D
A
L 
Tidal turbines Generate energy when tidal currents rotate turbines more to 
the seafloor - similar to the generation of wind energy 
 
As of 2nd March 2006, there are currently 7 wave energy and 6 tidal energy devices nearing or 
at commercialisation stage worldwide (Table 2). 
                                                
15 EECA Fact Sheet No 5 – Marine Energy 
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Table 2. Current Market Readiness of Wave And Tidal Devices16. 
 System Company Country Size* Status 
PowerBuoy Ocean Power Technologies  USA 20 kW  
Commercial 
 
Pelamis Ocean Power Delivery Ltd.  UK 750 kW Commercial  
Limpet Wavegen UK 500 kW Commercial 
“Buldra” Fred. Olsen Ltd.  Norway 500 kW 
Prototype testing 
complete - set for 
commercialisation 
“Parabolic 
Wall” 
Energetech  
 
AUS 300 kW 
Prototype testing 
complete – set for 
commercialisation 
W
A
VE
 
‘Manchester 
Bobber' 
The University of 
Manchester 
Intellectual Property 
Ltd 
UK Variable Prototype testing 
 
Archimedes 
Wave 
Swing 
Teamwork 
Technology B.V Netherlands 2 MW Prototype testing 
      
Turbine Verdant Power USA 36 kW Commercial 
Turbine Hammerfest Strom Norway 300 kW Commercial 
Seaflow Marine Current 
Technologies 
UK 1 MW Prototype testing 
complete - set for 
commercialisation 
Tidal 
lagoons 
Tidal Electric UK Variable Planning 
developments 
Vertical axis 
turbine 
Blue Energy Canada 250 kW Planning full scale 
prototype 
TI
D
A
L 
TidEl SMD Hydrovision UK 1 MW Planning full scale 
prototype 
*The size of the device given here is the rating for one device though many are designed to be built as an array 
utilizing multiple units.  
Literature references suggest that wave power is likely to  be best suited to small to medium 
sized generation extending to 20MW capacity at any single site. Tidal current systems are 
likely to be a magnitude greater17.  
c. The International Wave & Tidal Energy Industry: 
Tidal barrages have been generating energy in Europe since 1966 (i.e. the 240MW La Rance 
plant in France) and in the US since 1984 (i.e. the 20MW Annapolis plant)18. Despite falling 
out of favour due to its adverse environmental effects, a new 254MW tidal dam is currently 
being built in South Korea. Their contributions have, however, been small and development 
has been slow. 
                                                
16 Sherman, M & Fisher, GW; “The Current Status of Wave & Tidal Energy”, Pacific Clean Energy, p2 (pers. comm.) 
17 CAE, New & Emerging Renewable Energy Opportunities in New Zealand (1996):pp169-188 
18 Sherman, M & Fisher, GW;, ibid 
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This is despite tremendous support internationally (and from European governments in 
particular) for the development of commercial devices within 3-5 years19, including: 
ß The opening of the European Marine Energy Park (EMEC) in 2004; 
ß A GBP 50m UK Marine Energy Development Fund; and, 
ß A pledge of GBP 42m (NZ$111m) in 2005 by the UK Minister of Energy to facilitate 
wave and tidal energy feeding into the UK national grid by 200820. 
The WaveGen and the Pelamis devices are already producing energy for local grids in a 
number of locations and other devices are expected to come on stream shortly. The 
availability of these devices commercially is leading to the emergence of a NZ wave & tidal 
industry.   
d. The New Zealand Wave & Tidal Energy Industry: 
There are currently 12 wave & tidal projects underway in New Zealand at various stages of 
development21. Most of the projects appear to be relatively small, privately funded, led by 
entrepreneurs and enthusiasts and focused on testing or proving devices developed overseas 
in New Zealand conditions. 
One government-funded project was identified - the FRST funded NIWA-IRL-Power Projects 
Ltd joint venture (FRST Contract C08X0401). This project commenced in 2004 with the 
objective of deploying a nominal commercial device in NZ waters by July 200822. The JV are 
currently evaluating a range of potential devices while one of the JV Partners, IRL, is 
understood to be developing a device of its own.   
Power companies, who would be expected to be involved in evaluating both devices and 
potential installation sites as part of a balanced generation portfolio, reported low levels of 
interest and activity in wave and tidal energy, merely maintaining of “watching briefs”. They 
cited the more established and predictable resource consent outcomes for wind projects, 
lower comparative generation costs, proven technology and existing policy support as 
factors for their focus on wind over wave and tidal energy.  
None of the NZ projects reported deployment horizons of less than 24 months, for reasons 
including capital, availability of suitable devices and timeframes for consent applications, for 
construction of on-site and site-to-shore transmission infrastructure and for negotiating grid 
access.  
However, AWATEA (the Aotearoa Wave And Tidal Energy Association) noted at its inaugural 
meeting in Wellington on the 10th of March that the association was expecting the deployment 
of a pre-commercial or demonstration technology in NZ within 3-5 years. This seems 
optimistic. 
A more realistic scenario, however, may be a deployment horizon as far out as 10 years from 
2006. This was the consensus that emerged at a Renewable Energy Technology Scanning 
Workshop run by CAE for MED and NZTE in Christchurch in February 2006.  
However, while deployment and installation timeframes for wave & tidal devices will be 
shorter than for large scale hydro or thermal due to their modular design and scalability and 
also their relatively low environmental impact, timeframes are dependent on the availability of 
installation equipment (e.g. ‘jack up’ rigs to drill mooring points into the sea bed), specialist 
staff, access to transmission infrastructure, and securing both use rights and resource 
consent approval.  
Whilst a promising technology, international experience suggests that without some form of 
government assistance wave and tidal projects, in the near term, will be unlikely to achieve 
the price point at which they are competitive with wind or other conventional forms of 
renewable energy. 
                                                
19 EECA, ibid. 
20 Huckerby, John Maritime 21 Presentation, February 2006 
21 John Huckerby, Presentation at inaugural AWATEA Meeting, 10-02-2006 
22 John Huckerby, Presentation on Wave & Energy Conversion at the Maritime 21 Oceans of Opportunities 
Workshop, Lincoln University, Feb 2005 
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e. Reported Barriers 
The following issues were raised by the respondents as potential barriers to the development 
of a wave & tidal energy industry in New Zealand.  
a. POLICY 
The policy issues reported by respondents were centred on the scope and resulting cost 
of the RMA process, the perceived inconsistent processing of applications and the need 
for a specific protocol for wave and tidal energy applications to potentially address the 
former. The RMA difficulties reported are largely anecdotal and have not been validated. 
Resource Management Act 
It was argued that the RMA was too blunt an instrument to support the development of 
the emerging wave and tidal industry because: 
ß The extensive data and consultation requirements were disproportionate to the small 
scale of the predominantly Proof-of-Concept or demonstration projects proposed; 
ß The respondents would bear a disproportionate share of the costs of developing a 
standardised protocol for assessing wave and tidal applications; 
ß The costs to meet the above were consequently disproportionate to the scale of the 
projects and was diverting capital away from expenditure items on engineering and 
other project activities; 
ß As a relatively new activity, a standard protocol to specifically assess wave and tidal 
applications isn’t available. Respondents reported that they were anticipating high 
direct and opportunity costs while such a protocol was developed and refined, and  
This is anticipated to lead to relatively high application and opportunity costs for the 
respondents as the data requirements for the consent application (e.g. effects, 
hazards and resources) are still undefined, baseline data to measure potential effects 
is not available and may need to be developed from scratch;  
ß The NIMBY syndrome and the relatively easy process for objections were cited as 
major concerns, along with concerns related to so-called ‘vexatious’ objectors within 
the RMA legislation;  
ß This uncertainty was also deemed to be compounded by the varying levels of 
expertise among regional councils in processing applications for offshore projects, 
which in turn was expected to create delays in the approval process as consent 
officers sought external advice to process new and unfamiliar scenarios. It is also 
worth noting that none of the respondents had actually applied for consent although 
an application was likely from one respondent within 6 months.     
ß Respondents also cited the provisions of the Marine Reserves Act, the Aquaculture 
Moratorium and the Foreshore and Seabed issues as having a significant impact on 
their risk management plans and capital raising activities due to the resulting 
uncertainty surrounding their ability to secure use, occupancy and/or property rights; 
ß Respondents cited the related issues of “first in first served” and “the free rider 
problem” as barriers to development of the industry in general. Better-resourced 
respondents expressed a reluctance to expend capital to ‘blaze a trail’ and develop a 
new industry, when doing so would lower entry barriers to ‘cowboys’. It is also worth 
noting that one respondent was thinking tactically about this issue and planned to 
exploit perceived loopholes in the RMA legislation to secure occupancy rights and 
block potential competitors. However, no detail on these loopholes was provided on 
the grounds of commercial sensitivity. 
Allocation Regime 
ß The issue of consent “squatters” was also raised, with parallels to the aquaculture 
industry where speculators sought to lock up, through the consent process, and then 
sell access to significant areas of coastline to aqua-culturists;     
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ß Respondents operating as entrepreneurs or enthusiasts generally seemed to fixate 
on the bad news surrounding the RMA process, particularly with respect to cases 
from parallel industries like aquaculture and coastal development;  
Restricted Activities 
ß Respondents also cited fragmentation in policy, implementation (by regional councils) 
and regulation (by government departments and agencies) as significant issues. 
Additionally, funding issues were perceived as being the reasons for lack of interest 
among specific government departments to address issues impacting on their 
industry unless specifically tasked to do so and only for the areas in which they have 
been tasked; 
ß Extent and the complexity of consultation were also raised as an issue. Large scale 
consent applications for wave and tidal are likely to treated as a restricted coastal 
activity. As such, consent applications would require to be approved by the Minister of 
Conservation as the final decision maker under the RMA. The likelihood also of 
additional information being sought by regional councils and other stakeholders will 
all contribute to higher costs disproportionate to the scale of the anticipated projects; 
ß The establishment of a responsible Allocation regime was raised as a priority activity 
for Government due to potential competition for the relatively few optimal tidal sites 
and more extensive wave sites; 
ß Finally, the effect of possible retrospective policy changes as the new Oceans Policy 
regime is implemented was raised as another issue that respondents felt could 
impact on their projects. We suggest however, that this is simply a project risk 
management issue. 
b. INFORMATION 
Respondents suggested that resolution of the following issues would greatly assist them 
in their projects:  
ß Resource data needs to be centralised, as it is currently fragmented and not easily 
accessible;  
ß Resource data need to be updated as the currently available information dates back 
to the late 1980’s to work undertaken by ECNZ as part of its limited evaluation of 
wave and tidal energy technology. It could be argued that this is a private good and 
ultimately the responsibility of a developer. A comparison with current wind projects 
indicates that in the case of wind, project sponsors have gathered the site information 
at their own volition; 
ß Reasonably priced access to resource data needs to be facilitated. Respondents 
have reported issues accessing the ECNZ resource information from Shell, who 
purchased the information from ECNZ in the mid 1990’s; 
ß At a national level, more extensive resource mapping and collation of site specific 
data would allow better matching of sites to projects of a particular scale or utilising 
specific technologies. The availability of site specific information could have a positive 
impact on the allocation regime by moderating competition for sites. See comment 
above. We accept however, that there is a public good element in data gathering and 
collection but it is a matter of achieving the right balance; 
ß More extensive and accurate site specific baseline data would enhance the impact 
assessment requirements of the RMA process. We suggest that this is a sponsor’s 
responsibility; 
ß More information required on the environmental effects of subsurface structures. 
While structures would increase biodiversity, they could also attract more intelligent 
organisms e.g. dolphins wanting to play; 
ß More resource information will be required for ocean tidal vs. harbour tidal, in-situ 
production opportunities (e.g. hydrogen), materials design and development; 
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Whilst we may not be totally in agreement with the comments above, they reflect the realities 
faced by the current wave and tidal project sponsors in that the requirements being placed on 
them for detailed baseline data is inappropriate given the lack of information in the public 
domain. The result is thus, a potentially unfair burden is placed on such frontier activities. We 
refer to our comments in the main body of the report that in these situations, a greater risk 
tolerance is an appropriate response. 
c. TECHNOLOGY & SPECIALIST EQUIPMENT 
The issues reported centred on the availability and cost of the devices and the availability 
of equipment for their installation and deployment. 
ß Technology licensing costs are high despite lack of investment grade information 
(e.g. licence for Pelamis device estimated at NZD $400k despite no info on power 
curve or whole-of-life costs);  
ß Respondents believe that they will face delays in accessing specialist technologies 
(e.g. rigs) for installation of their devices due to the tight supply internationally;  
d. INVESTMENT 
As discussed previously, most of the projects are small in scale, run by enthusiasts 
(rather than power companies) and appear undercapitalised. 
The following issues were cited as factors impacting on investment into their projects: 
ß The uncertainty caused by policy issues such as the Foreshore and Seabed debate 
and the Aquaculture Moratorium (around their perceived ability or otherwise to secure 
resource approvals, suitable sites and long-term operating approvals).  
ß Legislation restricts certain potential investors/strategic partners from entering the 
market– e.g. the Electricity Industry Reform Act requires separation of ‘generation’ 
from ‘networks’ or distribution and restricts, for example, lines’ companies ownership 
of power plants. 
e. INFRASTRUCTURE 
The following infrastructure related issues were reported: 
ß Some level of government assistance will be required for to kick-start the 
development of offshore, onsite infrastructure; 
ß Access to the national grid will need to be facilitated; 
ß Determining responsibility for back up storage or co-generation facilities to smooth 
generation peaks; 
f. OTHER 
ß The lack of a wave or tidal energy focused courses within existing Renewable Energy 
programmes courses at New Zealand universities will limit the development of the 
necessary skill base to service the industry. This is already being seen in the inability 
of the respondents to secure qualified people for small scale POC or demonstration 
projects. In the view of the Study Team, this is an irrelevancy as core skills in 
mechanical engineering, power engineering, control systems and related skills areas 
are well covered by conventional tertiary engineering programmes. The issue is that 
these skills are in high demand and there are excellent other opportunities in the 
marketplace; 
ß The single tank testing facility at Auckland University is not designed for the testing 
and development of wave and tidal devices. Respondents suggested that inadequate 
facilities will limit activity in the industry and force proponents to test technology 
offshore. We note on the other hand, that overseas technology developers do not see 
this as a major issue as presumably  they have access to their own in-house facilities 
or similar; 
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f. Suggested Interventions 
POLICY issues: 
1. Government should consider taking the lead on facilitating the development of a 
specific assessment protocol for wave & tidal energy projects which reflects the risk 
profile of these types of activities. The protocol should take into account the scope of 
proposed projects (i.e. demonstration or proof-of-concept vs. commercial projects) 
and scale the data and consultation requirements accordingly, which should expedite 
the consent process to the advantage of the project sponsor; 
2. Better communication on resource consent applications, outcomes and 
corresponding rationales could address the respondents’ general fixation on failures 
in the RMA process; 
3. An Web Directory to direct wave & tidal practitioners to appropriate experts and 
advisers would ensure that they receive timely advice to prevent poor information and 
misconceptions from becoming entrenched;   
4. Government should also consider developing a training programme for Regional 
Councils around the Taranaki Regional Council’s expertise in offshore resource 
permits in order to address the reported processing inconsistencies across other 
councils; 
5. The centralisation of the approval process for offshore consent applications is a 
further intervention that Government should consider to streamline the consent 
process to ensure consistency of application of the RMA across the regional councils;  
6. Government should also consider the policy framework to prevent the emergence of 
a Wild West scenario for wave and tidal energy previously seen in the aquaculture 
industry (i.e. first come first served, squatting, overlapping permits). One mechanism 
may be to implement an oil & gas exploration type work programme regime or fishing 
quota type regime;  
7. Government should also facilitate wide consultation around the development of a 
Code of Practice to test RMA and identify issues specific to wave & tidal projects; 
RESOURCE INFORMATION issues: 
8. FRST support for a National Wave & Tidal Resource Database should be 
investigated. An estimate of $4.6m over 5 years has been provided for the 
development of a nationwide wave-rider buoy network that could provide data for 
wave & tidal, hazard investigations, navigation advisory, hydrodynamic modelling, 
marine structure design analysis. The precedence for FRST support for such an 
initiative has been set by its funding of the National Water Resources database 
established in the 1950’s. Benefits would include more moderate competition for sites 
by allowing closer matching of technologies and generation capacities with specific 
sites; 
INVESTMENT issues: 
9. Addressing the policy issues discussed above will probably resolve the sovereign risk 
issues affecting inwards investment; 
10. Government should probably consider mechanisms to facilitate information sharing 
regarding wave and tidal or renewable energy funding programmes; 
INFRASTRUCTURE issues: 
11. Government could facilitate discussion around industry funding the development of a 
‘Marine Energy Park’ similar in concept to Wave Hub UK or the European Marine 
Energy Centre (EMEC).  
12. This Marine Energy Park could operate as a technology incubator, testing ground for 
new devices and perhaps as a conduit for commercial energy parks located in close 
proximity. It could be expected that establishment of a second tank testing facility 
onsite would be integral to the Energy Park; 
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13. Government should be facilitating discussion between wave & tidal proponents, other 
power companies and the transmission company to develop a grid access protocol 
and also issues around the scale and responsibility for back up storage facilities;  
g. Commercial Opportunities: 
a. The establishment of a Marine Energy Park in New Zealand with a technology 
incubation focus could attract more wave and tidal R&D and demonstration projects 
from overseas.  A number of respondents reported approaches from overseas 
companies interested in conducting wave and tidal R&D projects in New Zealand on 
the basis that New Zealand’s lower population density will provide better access to 
test sites than in Europe.   
b. Respondents have also suggested that government support for an international 
Conference on wave & tidal energy, given the current interest in the industry and the 
number of devices currently being commercialised, could go some way towards 
establishing New Zealand as a centre for wave and tidal energy R&D.  
However, we note that Government may have other priorities under its Growth and 
Innovation Strategy in respect of where New Zealand might reasonably expect to 
achieve world class performance in new technology development. 
Summary & Conclusion 
Based on the interest and activity in the industry, and the range of devices currently being 
commercialised, the Study Team’s provisional conclusion is that one or more business cases 
are about to emerge that could establish the platform for the growth of the wave and tidal 
energy industry in New Zealand. 
In the short to medium term, the early wave and tidal energy projects are likely to address 
niche opportunities by seeking to offset some level of financial return against the opportunity 
to leverage or demonstrate the technology and/or secure access to the marine resource. 
Their underlying business cases are likely to be sub-commercial (or commercial only on a 
small scale), where their economic value is likely to be in terms of supporting network 
reliability rather than from pure generation potential.  
While the respondents have indicated a preoccupation with resource issues, it is the Study 
Team’s position that the wave and tidal energy industry represents a technology rather than 
a resource opportunity as we believe that technology risk issues, rather than access to the 
wave and tidal resource, that will form the main impediments to fully commercial deployment. 
Finally, the Study Team suggests the following areas for further investigation:   
1. A review of the development of the Wind Power industry could provide a more 
relevant ‘guide’ or critical success factors for the development of the wave and tidal 
energy sector than the Maui success story used for this investigation; 
2. An analysis of the impact of relevant marine legislation and policy, and the Marine 
Reserves Act in particular, on the economic implications to the economy from the 
exclusion of optimal wave and tidal energy sites from commercial use; 
3. A review of the Aquaculture sector could provide some useful lessons towards the 
development of an allocation regime for the wave and tidal industry that would 
encourage development of the industry while sanctioning inefficient use of the 
resource and anticompetitive use of the consent process.   
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CASE STUDY 4: ISSUES AND BARRIERS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A 
GAS HYDRATE SECTOR 
a. Introduction 
Although surveys have indicated the potential presence of large volumes of gas hydrate on 
the Hikurangi Margin off the East Coast of New Zealand’s North Island and the Fiordland-
Puysegur Margin on the West Coats of the South Island, the study team was unable to 
identify any participants in the oil and gas sector currently involved in or planning in the near 
term to participate in the economic development of the gas hydrate resource.  
Consequently, this Case Study is based on feedback provided by members of the Science 
community, in particular GNS and NIWA.     
b. Methane Hydrates 
Natural gas hydrates are solid, ice-like materials containing predominantly methane and small 
quantities of other gases bound in a lattice of water molecules formed at moderate high 
pressure and at temperatures close to the freezing point of water. They are found in high 
concentrations in the “Hydrate Stability Zone”, which are permafrost regions onshore and in 
ocean bottom sediments in water depths exceeding 450m. 
One of their unique characteristics is that at sea level and at standard pressure, gas hydrates 
will disassociate or dissolve and the methane component of the hydrate lattice or cage will 
expand to 163 times its ‘frozen’ volume. 
Gas Hydrates have attracted a lot of interest in the past decade because: 
ß Natural gas is expected to be the fastest growing primary energy source in the world over 
the next 25 years23; 
ß Methane Hydrates constitute a potentially vast, relatively climate friendly and efficient 
source of natural gas, with large deposits located in close proximity to expected growth 
demand areas (e.g. Japan and India) compared to current resource areas for 
conventional gas24;   
ß Significant methane hydrate deposits have been discovered within the jurisdiction of 
countries currently without indigenous oil or gas resources, e.g. Japan, India, Korea.  
The “Central Consensus” estimate of the potential size of the methane hydrate resource 
worldwide is approximately 742,000 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of gas, compared to the estimated 
natural gas resources (excluding methane hydrates) of approximately 13 million tcf25. 
Irrespective of the actual figures involved, the magnitude of the potential resource base of gas 
hydrates could, if successfully commercialised, power the world for centuries.  
c. The Importance of Methane Hydrates to New Zealand 
New Zealand shares with the rest of the world, an ongoing and increasing demand for natural 
gas. The depletion of the Maui gas field and the lack of capacity from both existing wells and 
recent discoveries to meet anticipated demand in the future will force the introduction of new 
strategies to meet the energy supply gap. One potential opportunity may be the economic 
development of New Zealand’s considerable methane hydrate resources. 
New Zealand has the most promising known gas hydrate resource potential in the Southwest 
Pacific, with the Hikurangi Margin in particular deemed to be one of the most promising gas 
hydrate provinces in the world26.  
                                                
23 Natural Gas 1998: Issues And Trends; Energy Information Administration; p73 
24 Pecher, I.A & Henrys, S.A, Potential Gas Reserves In Gas Hydrate Sweet Spots on the Hikurangi Margin, New 
Zealand; Science Report No 23, Institute of Geological & Nuclear Sciences (2003) 
25 Natural Gas 1998: Issues And Trends; Energy Information Administration; p73 
26 Pecher, I.A; Gas Hydrates-Fuel Of The Future: A New Zealand Perspective, Presentation to MfE Workshop, 
Wellington, 13-03-2006 
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The Hikurangi Margin covers an area of approximately 50,000 km2, extending from offshore 
Gisborne on the East Coast of the North Island southwards to offshore Marlborough. A recent 
study by Pecher and Henrys (2003) suggests a methane hydrate resource base of 
approximately 228.5km3 of gas, with approximately 813 trillion cubic feet or tcf potentially 
recoverable.  More importantly, Pecher & Henrys suggest that up to 10% of this area may be 
covered by “sweet spots” or areas with very high gas hydrate concentrations. They have 
further suggested that these sweet spots collectively could contain recoverable gas more than 
6 times the size of Maui and more than 16 times the size of New Zealand’s known gas 
reserves as of June 200227. One sweet spot in particular is estimated to contain recoverable 
gas equivalent to 10% of the original volume of the Maui field. 
Notwithstanding the technical complexities of extraction and production and a number of 
environmental concerns, gas hydrate sweet spots could provide an economically viable 
opportunity for New Zealand.   
d. Gas Hydrate Research  
Despite the huge potential economic opportunity, funding for gas hydrate research in New 
Zealand is not on par with the levels of research funding in Japan, Canada or the US.  
Japan is the current leader in gas hydrate research, with an annual research budget of 
USD$50m and a target of commercially viable production of natural gas from gas hydrates by 
2016. Since commencing in the mid 1990’s, the Japanese programme has developed two 
exploration test wells, one onshore in the McKenzie Delta in the Canadian Artic in 1997 and 
one offshore in the Nankai Trough, Japan in 2000, as well as an onshore production ‘concept’ 
well in the McKenzie Delta in 2002. It is worth noting that as recently as March 2006, the 
Japanese programme has claimed that they expect to achieve their target of commercial 
production of gas hydrates within a 2-year window of 201628.     
US gas hydrate research is close behind Japan, with US$50m in gas hydrates research 
funding committed over a 5-year period by the Federal Methane & Hydrate R&D Act 2000. 
The US research programme includes two dedicated Ocean Drilling Programme (ODP) legs 
at Blake Ridge on the US East Coast (which commenced in 1995) and at Hydrate Ride, off 
the coast of Oregon (which commenced in 2002), as well as collaboration with Japan and 
Canada in exploration activities on Alaska’s North Slope. 
The United States Geologic Survey has estimated Alaska's North Slope methane hydrates 
resources at 590 trillion cubic feet, with an additional 32,375 trillion cubic feet in the nearby 
Beaufort and Chukchi Seas. The location of methane hydrates near proven conventional gas 
reserves will ensure that Alaska’s North Slope will be the premier area for methane hydrate 
research and future production in the near future. 
India, Korea and China are also involved in gas hydrate research, predominantly into its 
characterisation as a potential energy source.  
e. Gas Hydrate Research in New Zealand 
Notwithstanding the relatively low levels of gas hydrate research funding, the quality of New 
Zealand research appears to be internationally recognised and valued. Evidence of this may 
be found in the participation of New Zealand researchers in a number of international 
research projects and also in their key role in driving and securing international support for the 
development of an “International Gas Hydrates Research Corridor” on the Hikurangi Margin.    
There are two key Crown funded research projects currently underway: 
ß An investigation into the characterisation of New Zealand’s gas hydrates as a potential 
energy source, funded by the Foundation for Research, Science and Technology (FRST) 
between 2003-09; 
ß An investigation into the relationship between the disassociation of natural gas from gas 
hydrates into the ocean under natural conditions and seafloor stability, sponsored by the 
Marsden Fund. 
                                                
27 Pecher, I.A & Henrys, S.A (2003); ibid: pg1 
28 Pecher, I.A. (personal communication)  
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The GNS gas hydrate Task Force led by Dr Ingo Pecher, a marine seismologist, currently 
heads New Zealand gas hydrate research. Members of the Task Force include:  
ß GNS - Stuart Henrys, marine seismologist; Susan Ellis, modeller; Kevin Faure, 
geochemist; Jens Greinert, University of Ghent, Belgium currently undertaking an EU 
Fellowship at GNS, geochemist; 
The Task Force is currently in collaboration with: 
ß Otago University - Andrew Gorman, geophysicist; Gareth Crutchly and Miko Fohrman, 
PhD candidates and geophysicists; 
ß NIWA – Helen Neil, paleoceanographer and Steve Chiswell, oceanographer; 
ß GeoForschungsZentrum in Potsdam, Germany – Nina Kukowski, modeller. 
International collaboration in 2006-2008 includes:  
ß A joint US-New Zealand funded expedition on the NIWA vessel R/V Tangaroa in 2006 to 
conduct high resolution seismic and piston coring of the Hikurangi Margin; 
ß A German funded expedition on the German research vessel R/V Sonne in 2007 that will 
assist them to address some of the objectives of the Marsden and FRST projects; 
In the medium to long term, New Zealand researchers hope to leverage their research 
capabilities by: 
ß Expanding existing collaboration arrangements with Chile & Korea; 
ß Establishing an “International Gas Hydrates Research Corridor” on the Hikurangi Margin; 
ß Developing new collaboration opportunities through attendance at relevant international 
conferences; 
f. Reported Issues and Barriers 
POLICY 
ß The significance of the potential economic value requires policy debate now, and 
potentially the development of appropriate allocation regime to protect the resource while 
encouraging the development of a gas hydrates industry. Gas hydrates represent truly 
frontier opportunity, with limited information and high technical risk. Consequently, a 
robust yet risk tolerant regime will be required to facilitate development of the opportunity.   
ß Attention was drawn to the Marine Reserves Act 1971 which would potentially strand new 
opportunities as it prohibits protected areas (e.g. national parks) from prospecting and 
other commercial activities. 
RESOURCE INFORMATION 
ß Although the Hikurangi Margin has been surveyed to some degree, more research is still 
required to map and appraise gas hydrate sweet spots in the area, and prioritise sweet 
spots for future development when the technology becomes available;  
ß More research into the characterisation of the New Zealand gas hydrate resource is also 
required as methane compositions in hydrates can vary geographically, with resulting 
implications for extraction and production; 
TECHNOLOGY & EQUIPMENT 
ß Commercial production technology is currently unavailable, although conventional oil and 
gas technologies could be adapted; 
ß Significant technical issues currently exist around extraction and transportation of gas 
hydrates; 
INVESTMENT 
ß The high levels of gas hydrate research may be an indicator of the potentially high cost of 
extraction and production technology when they become available; 
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ß Access to the technology may require some level of government involvement or support, 
as occurred with the development of Maui;  
ß Attracting inwards private investment on the scale anticipated will require attractive 
policies and incentives OR better promotion of the higher prospectivity of the New 
Zealand gas hydrate resources relative to Alaska and Gulf of Mexico, the current focus of 
hydrate research by USA, Japan & Canada.  
INFRASTRUCTURE 
ß Existing onshore Taranaki infrastructure could be utilised if the technical issues around 
extraction and transportation are successfully addressed; 
ß There may also be a business case for the development of new infrastructure on the East 
Coast of the North Island to be in closer proximity to the sweet spots on the Hikurangi 
Margin. Such infrastructure is likely to follow successful petroleum development in the 
region; 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
There are a number of environmental issues currently being debated internationally around 
gas hydrates.  
ß The “Smoking Gun” hypothesis suggests that the release of methane into the atmosphere 
from disassociating gas hydrates creates one of two climate change scenarios: 
Source: Ingo Pecher: Presentation to MfE Workshop 13/0/2006 
ß There is also the ongoing debate around the proposition that the extraction of gas 
hydrates from the seabed could affect seabed stability and lead to landslips or slides, 
resulting in tsunamis; 
ß Finally, there are “chemo-synthetic” bio organism colonies associated with gas hydrate 
deposits that not well understood or researched. This lack of information will have a 
bearing on the ability of pioneers to secure resource consents under the present consent 
regime. 
g. Suggested Interventions 
1. Respondents have suggested that Government should lead a national or international 
discussion on gas hydrates, while the industry is still in formative stage, to identify 
issues pertinent to economic development of New Zealand’s gas hydrate resource to 
ensure adequate debate and encapsulation of issues into policy; 
2. Respondents have suggested that policy should ensure that relevant Ministers retain 
their discretion to permit new or novel opportunities, such as gas hydrates, to emerge 
in New Zealand’s ocean territories. The key point here is that the regulatory 
environment needs flexibility to provide for new activities; 
Page 50  Sustainable Development of NZ’s Ocean Resources Report 
3. Given the potential economic significance of gas hydrates, both respondents and the 
Study Team agrees that policy needs to be set before ‘trailblazing’ should be allowed 
to commence; 
4. We agree that the policy environment should attract inwards investment for 
exploration, discovery and development. Gas hydrates could provide a long term 
opportunity to replicate the skills and engineering base that the development of Maui 
catalysed and NZ has developed into a significant export opportunity since;   
5. The respondents, participants at the MfE Workshop and the Study Team agrees that 
a closer integration of science policy (e.g. mapping sweet spots and characterising 
hydrates) and a ‘national’ engineering policy (i.e. to develop ‘enabling’ skills and 
technologies) with Oceans policy in the short to medium term should occur as a 
strategy to facilitate the eventual commercial development of the gas hydrates 
opportunity,  
6. Further to this, we concur that in support of the development of a gas hydrate industry 
in New Zealand, Government should actively facilitate the opportunity development 
continuum from science investigation, to resource mapping, to a pre-
commercialisation stage, at which point the typical oil & gas field development 
process can kick in prior to commencing commercial production; 
7. Finally, we also agree that a strategy needs to be developed to ensure that the 
mapping and quantification or appraisal of hydrate reserves, including intensive 
testing of sweet spots on the Hikurangi Margin, becomes a strategic national priority.  
Summary & Conclusion 
The economic development of New Zealand’s Gas Hydrates resource represents a truly 
classic frontier opportunity, involving high risk and potentially higher rewards on a scale vastly 
larger than any of the other case studies considered in this investigation. 
Given the significant economic potential of its successful commercialisation, the study team 
suggests that further investigation is required into the following issues: 
ß To what extent and in what timeframe does NZ need to prepare for the 
economic development of this resource? Given that technology is not currently 
available for extraction and production, should New Zealand wait till it becomes 
available to begin developing policy or should discussion on an appropriately risk 
tolerant policy framework be commenced now?  
ß At what point and in what role should government become involved in the 
development of the industry? Using the analogy of gas hydrates as a “ripening 
crop” waiting to be harvested, it is important to note that pioneers may be prepared to 
accept “green fruit”. Consequently, there is a dynamic that has to be actively 
managed between ensuring that policy enables pioneering activity while 
simultaneously protecting the national interest to the extent that “picking winners” 
does not prevent an optimal development of the resource opportunity. Again, the key 
point is that the regulatory regime needs flexibility to allow unfettered entry and exit;  
ß Are gas hydrates governed by the Crown Minerals Act and if so, are the 
provisions appropriate to the sector? As gas hydrates fall within the “hydrocarbon” 
definition of the Crown Minerals Act, prospecting permits can be granted under the 
current regime. However, an analogous case has arisen in respect of minerals 
(notably gold) associated with active and extinct volcanic vents. In 2002 a very large 
permit covering virtually all of New Zealand’s potential resources of this type, was 
given to an Australian entrepreneur. While this may or may not lead to the emergence 
of a viable new industry, the possibility that a monopoly situation might arise that 
limits other potential entrants should exploration prove successful may be 
undesirable, and this consideration needs to be carefully balanced with the need for a 
property right of sufficient scale to encourage investment. 
Additionally, the conventional permitting regimes may need to be adjusted as the 
development of the gas hydrate opportunity is likely to fall outside the timeframes that 
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apply under current act (i.e. a 10-year permit term) thereby requires a more flexible 
permitting regime; 
ß What is the optimal regime to enable the Crown to capture a benefit from the 
development of the resource? Will a unique regime be required or will the existing 
regime support the expected low margin high volume business case? Without an 
appropriate regulatory framework in place, there may not be the required allocation 
and environmental management regimes to maximise their resource potential. 
ß What is the optimal policy framework for gas hydrates? Given the size of the 
potential economic opportunity and the international interest, the Study Team 
suggests that it needs to be based on clear principles, contains codes of practice that 
constrains proponents to act competitively and also provides clear certainty that 
projects will not be compulsorily acquired, nationalised or taken over. 
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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF RESPONDENTS 
 
Name Organisation Contribution 
Brian Gundersen 
& Don Turley 
Kensington Swan RMA / Legislation / Maui 
Tara Ross-Watt Maritime NZ RMA / Oceans Policy / Oceans Jurisdiction / 
Wave & Tidal 
John Huckerby AWATEA Wave & Tidal 
Murray Hill Meridian Energy Wave & Tidal 
Gavin Fisher & 
Micah Sherman 
Pacific Clean Energy Wave & Tidal 
Paul Henson Pearson Innovation Wave & Tidal 
Anthony Bellve Crest Energy Wave & Tidal 
Dennis Jamieson NIWA Wave & Tidal 
Paul Hazledine NGC Exploration / Maui / Gas Hydrates 
Geoff Cassells Ex Shell Exploration / Maui 
Clyde Bennett Tap Oil Exploration 
Dr Mac Beggs GeoSphere Exploration 
Ingo Pecher GNS Gas Hydrates 
Ian Wright NIWA Gas Hydrates 
 
ADDITIONAL WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS 
Daniel Brown Ministry for the Environment 
Dr George Hooper Centre For Advanced Engineering 
Scott Caldwell Centre For Advanced Engineering 
Kevin Chong Nexus Consulting 
Peter Apperly Meridian Energy 
Darryl Thorburn Crown Minerals, MED 
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